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I. INTRODUCTION 
After Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA),1 debt collectors no longer had free rein to do as they pleased.  
It was a serious turn of events because until then many states had no 
effective laws to control the conduct of collectors.2  It was not unusual, 
therefore, to find debt collectors routinely harassing and deceiving 
consumers during the collection process.3  As a result, the FDCPA 
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 1.  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95–109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 2.  The Senate Report on the FDCPA gave some idea of the need for debt collection 
legislation:  
[W]hile 37 States and the District of Columbia do have laws regulating debt collectors, 
only a small number are comprehensive statutes which provide a civil remedy.  As an 
example of ineffective State laws, of the 16 states which regulate by debt collection 
boards, 12 require by law that a majority of the board be comprised of debt collectors. 
S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.  
 3.  The congressional hearings on the FDCPA produced many examples of consumers’ 
experiences in the marketplace.  One witness observed as follows: 
While debt collection agencies generate numbers of complaints disproportionate to their 
size in the American economy, the most disturbing aspect of consumer grievances 
generated by collection agencies is the type of conduct which is complained about.  This 
conduct ranges from profanity and obscenity in phone calls to efforts to shame a 
consumer by contacting relatives, employers, neighbors to falsely threatening to seek 
harsh legal sanctions.  
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130 and H.R. 5294 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th 
Cong. 85 (1977) (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law Center).  
During the hearings, another witness indicated that his research showed that collectors justified their 
harsh collection methods on the basis of the consumer’s status as a “deadbeat.”  Id. at 237 (testimony 
of David Caplovitz, Professor of Sociology, Graduate School of the City of New York).  However, 
Professor Caplovitz explained the real reason for a consumer’s default this way:  
[T]he collection industry’s image of the default debtor as a deadbeat is a grotesque 
caricature that has virtually nothing to do with the realities of why debtors default . . . .  If 
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introduced new restraints on collectors that covered a wide span of 
activity. 
One provision that has received significant judicial attention forbids 
a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”4  
Although this restriction seems broad, § 1692e lists sixteen examples of 
specific violations without limiting the general application of the 
introductory language concerning false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations.5  Because the sixteen examples are not exhaustive, a 
collector may violate the statute even though its conduct does not fall 
within any of the specifically enumerated violations.6 
Section 1692e(3) prohibits the false representation that a collector’s 
communication is from an attorney.7  This provision has attracted 
attention because consumers frequently complain that a collection letter 
on law firm letterhead has misled them into thinking that an attorney has 
given such a letter her full attention and that litigation may be imminent.8  
Naturally, a collector wants to convey the impression to the consumer 
that an attorney has authored the collection message because it lends an 
air of seriousness to the communication.  The consumer probably knows 
                                                                                                                       
 
either his willingness to pay or his ability to pay is undermined, the credit transaction 
breaks down and the debtor defaults . . . .  People lose their jobs or are laid off, or they 
become ill and are unable to work. My research has shown that sudden losses of income 
are by far the major reason why debtors default on their credit obligations. 
Id. at 238 (testimony of David Caplovitz, Professor of Sociology, Graduate School of the City of 
New York). 
 4.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006).  This section is but a small part of the overall picture.  In 2010, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received 108,997 complaints about third-party collectors, 
around half of which dealt with repeated calls from such collectors.  See 2011 FTC ANNUAL 
REPORT: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 5. 
 5.  The introductory language of § 1692e reads as follows: “A debt collector may not use any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.  
Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this 
section . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 6.  See Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding that “[t]he sixteen subsections of section 1692e set forth a nonexhaustive list of practices 
that fall within [the] ban”); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that 
because the § 1692e list is nonexhaustive, a collection practice can be false, deceptive, or misleading 
even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of § 1692e); Chalik v. Westport Recovery Corp., 
677 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that “[t]he subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e . . . 
are a non-exhaustive list of examples of the type of conduct prohibited by the FDCPA”). 
 7.  15 U.S.C § 1692e(3). 
 8.  See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 2005); Taylor 
v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1236–37 (5th Cir. 1997); Clomon, 988 F.2d 
at 1317; Nichols v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., 760 F. Supp. 2d 275, 277 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Kelly 
v. Wolfpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (D. Colo. 2008).  
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that an attorney can take certain legal action that is not available to a lay 
collector, and therefore any implication of attorney involvement may 
intimidate the consumer.  The prohibition against a false representation 
of attorney involvement is intended to protect the consumer in this 
situation.  Some collectors, in an attempt to avoid the false representation 
label, include a clause in the collection letter indicating that no attorney 
has personally reviewed the consumer’s case.9  This Article discusses the 
role of such a disclaimer when a court has to decide whether a collector 
has made a false representation. 
Even if a collector makes such a representation, it violates the statute 
only if it does so “in connection with the collection of any debt.”10  There 
are frequent disagreements about whether a consumer has established the 
necessary connection when the collector makes certain overtures to the 
consumer, sometimes without actually demanding payment.11  The 
answer usually depends on the context of the communication and the 
nature of the contact between the parties.  The mere fact that the parties 
have established a relationship does not mean that every subsequent 
communication between them is in connection with collection of a debt.  
The link may be questionable, especially if the consumer initiates the 
subsequent contact.12  This Article explores what courts look for in 
                                                          
 9.  See, e.g., Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1003 (finding that disclaimers on the back of collection letters 
did not make clear to the least sophisticated consumer that the law firm was acting solely as a 
collector and not in any legal capacity); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that the disclaimer on the back of the collection letter contradicted the language on the front, and that 
the district court erred in dismissing the consumer’s complaint); Greco, 412 F.3d at 365 (holding 
that, by including disclaimer in collection letter, defendant did not make any false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation of attorney involvement); Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 
2d 1109, 1113–14 (D. Or. 2009) (finding that collection letter violated the FDCPA because the 
collection language contradicted the disclaimer). 
 10.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 11.  See Grden v. Leiken Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that 
ledger sent in response to debtor’s call was not in connection with collection of the debt); Gburek v. 
Litton Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that purpose of company’s letter was 
to get the mortgagor to discuss debt settlement options, thus creating a communication in connection 
with collection of a debt); Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a privacy notice sent in same envelope as collection letter 
was sent in connection with collection of debt).  
 12.  In Grden, the debtor contacted the collector about the amount due after the collector 
initiated its lawsuit.  643 F.3d at 173.  The collector responded by sending a ledger statement 
containing an incorrect amount.  Id. at 172–73.  Applying an objective standard, the court found that 
the ledger correspondence did not take place in connection with collection of the debt because the 
collector’s attempt to collect the debt was independent of the consumer’s inquiry.  Id. at 173.  The 
consumer failed to convince the court that there was a connection because his relationship with the 
collector arose only because of an outstanding debt.  See id. 
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determining whether a consumer has established the necessary 
connection. 
Although the FDCPA forbids false representations in connection 
with collection of a debt, there is a split in the federal circuits over 
whether such representations include communications to a consumer’s 
attorney.  The Third Circuit13 and the Fourth Circuit14 have rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s15 position that the statute does not cover a collector’s 
false representations to a consumer’s attorney.  As if this were not 
enough, the Seventh Circuit16 has applied the false representation rule to 
a collector’s communications with the consumer’s attorney, but 
introduced the additional element that any alleged violation should be 
considered from the perspective of a competent attorney, rather than that 
of an unsophisticated consumer.17  The theory is that if a collector’s 
representation does not mislead a competent attorney, then a collector 
should have no liability because an attorney acts as an intermediary to 
protect the consumer from a collector’s doings.18  This Article reviews 
the cases, addresses the different approaches that courts have taken to 
communications with a consumer’s attorney, and questions whether a 
collector should be absolved of liability for a violation in this context. 
                                                          
 13.  Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 14.  Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 15.  Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 16.  Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 17.  Most courts apply the “least sophisticated consumer” test in determining whether a 
statutory violation has occurred, the purpose being to protect “the gullible as well as the shrewd.”  
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).  In this way, the test “ensures the protection 
of all consumers, even the naïve and the trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices, and . . . 
protects debt collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection 
notices.”  Id. at 1320; see also Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting the least sophisticated consumer standard); Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (same); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(same); United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135–36 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Bentley 
v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 
760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) (same).  The Seventh Circuit, dissatisfied with the majority 
“least sophisticated consumer” standard, adopted a slight variation in the “unsophisticated 
consumer” test.  Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994).  The 
Seventh Circuit was concerned with protecting consumers “of below-average sophistication or 
intelligence” without tying the standard to “the very last rung on the sophistication ladder.”  Id.  The 
Seventh Circuit was more interested in ascertaining whether “a person of modest education and 
limited commercial savvy would be likely to be deceived.”  Evory, 505 F.3d at 774.  With respect to 
an attorney in collection matters, the Seventh Circuit justified its competent attorney standard by 
recognizing that an attorney’s “sophistication in collection matters would be less than that of the 
specialist practitioner but much greater than that of the average unsophisticated consumer.”  Id. 
 18.  See Evory, 505 F.3d at 774–75 (discussing the standard that applies to communications 
with a consumer’s attorney). 
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This Article concludes with a discussion of the strategies that 
collectors employ to elicit responses to their demands for payment.  
Collectors sometimes outline the available options for recovering an 
outstanding debt;19 other times the collector will induce the consumer to 
pay by threatening certain action that the collector cannot legally take, or 
does not intend to take.20  It is not unusual for a collector to face a 
consumer’s allegations about the amount or legal status of the debt.21  
The common thread running through these communications is their 
linguistic formulation, the play on words that leaves the consumer 
confused and wondering about the collector’s message.  In some cases, 
the collector’s assurance that it could do something to further collection 
will have a different impact than saying that it would do something.22  In 
other cases, a collector may create doubt about the character or amount 
of a debt by not clarifying what it means by the “principal” or the 
“amount due.”23  Only by looking to the cases can one make sense of the 
strategies that collectors employ in their recovery efforts. 
                                                          
 19.  See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that letter 
offering payment options as part of effort to resolve outstanding debt did not violate statute); Sparks 
v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (holding that “[m]erely 
advising the debtor of the agency’s options with which to pursue the debt is the sort of truism that is 
legally insufficient to violate § 1692e”); Mebane v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 481 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that offering consumer option to settle debt by payment of 70% of amount 
due by cashier’s check or money order did not violate statute because the collector did not have to 
list all acceptable modes of payment); Jackson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 
1019 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding that offering option to settle debt for 50% of current balance did not 
violate statute).  
 20.  See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that inclusion 
of privacy notice constituted threat to take illegal action to disclose nonpublic information, thus 
violating § 1692e); Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that sending 
collection letter stating that nonpayment could result in referral to attorney where collector had no 
intention of doing so violated § 1692e); Schwarm v. Craighead, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1079 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) (finding that collector’s threats of legal action or arrest were false because the collector 
never intended to follow through given that the debtors’ files did not meet the criteria for referral). 
 21.  See Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that collector’s characterization of consumer’s credit card debt as a loan did not violate § 1692e); 
Hahn v. Triumph P’ships, 557 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that the collector did not 
misrepresent the character of the consumer’s debt when it specified the amount of interest due, 
because that amount comprised interest that accrued after the collector bought the debt and not the 
interest that was already included when the collector took over the debt). 
 22.  Compare Brown, 464 F.3d at 455 (holding that it would be deceptive for collector to state 
that it could take legal action that it did not intend to take), with Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 
505 F. Supp. 864, 872 (D.N.D. 1981) (finding that statement that consumer’s nonpayment would 
place account in jeopardy did not violate § 1692e). 
 23.  See Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010); Wahl v. Midland 
Credit Mgmt., 556 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2009); Hutton v. Law Offices of Collins & Lamore, 668 
F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255–56 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Mushinsky v. Nelson, Watson & Assoc., 642 F. Supp. 
2d 470, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
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II. FALSE AND MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS 
A. The Attorney as Collector 
Collectors face daily challenges in recovering debts from defaulting 
debtors.  As a result, collectors frequently plan different strategies to 
persuade debtors to respond to their demands for payment.  If a 
consumer believes that she is dealing with an attorney collector, she is 
more likely to respond to a collection notice—and collectors recognize 
that fact.  Many collectors therefore will try to profit from this scenario 
by using language that suggests an attorney has entered the picture.  The 
only problem is that the FDCPA prohibits a collector from falsely 
representing that a collection letter comes from an attorney.24  The 
communication can pass the statutory test only if the attorney has 
personally considered the debtor’s case, and not merely lent her name to 
the collection process.25 
In Clomon v. Jackson, the signature lines of the collection letters 
indicated that the attorney was general counsel for NCB Collection 
Services and bore the attorney’s facsimile signature.26  The attorney 
himself made no decisions on individual files and did not approve the 
letters to the debtor.27  The collection letters indicated that the attorney 
had suggested the collector should take certain measures to collect the 
“seriously past due account.”28  The letters also assured the consumer 
that the consumer’s account was scheduled for “immediate review and/or 
further action as deemed appropriate.”29  This language raised questions 
                                                          
 24.  The statute prohibits “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an 
attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) (2006). 
 25.  See Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[a] lawyer who 
merely rents his letterhead to a collection agency violates the Act”); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 
1314, 1321 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “the use of an attorney’s signature implies—at least in the 
absence of language to the contrary—that the attorney signing the letter formed an opinion about 
how to manage the case of the debtor to whom the letter was sent”); Miller v. Upton, Cohen & 
Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that “[t]he signing attorney alone is 
responsible for exercising professional judgment concerning the existence of a valid debt before 
issuing a debt collection letter”); Palmer v. Stassinos, Nos. C-04-03026 RMW, C-05-02280 RMW, 
2009 WL 86705, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009) (stating that “a letter is not ‘from’ an attorney unless 
the lawyer, consistent with his professional ethical obligations, exercised direct control and 
supervision over the process by which the letter was sent”). 
 26.  988 F.2d 1314, 1317 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id.  The letters read in part: “After NCB reviews your collection file and previous 
correspondence sent you, I am suggesting we take the appropriate measures provided under the law 
to further implement the collection of your seriously past due account.”  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
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about the attorney’s involvement with the collection efforts.30  There was 
no consultation between the attorney and anyone from NCB Collection 
Services about the details of the debtor’s case, and the attorney’s 
facsimile signature merely conveyed the false impression that the letter 
was from the attorney.31  Furthermore, the letterhead indicating “P.D. 
Jackson, G.C., Attorney-at-Law, Offices of General Counsel,” provided 
ample evidence that the collector wanted to emphasize the reference to 
legal representation.32  The collector wanted to leave no doubt in the 
consumer’s mind that the communication came from an attorney.33 
Not all cases are as clean-cut as Clomon, and sometimes a court will 
find in favor of a collector when countervailing factors neutralize some 
faint reference to attorney status.  In Rumpler v. Philips & Cohen 
Associates, the collection letter bore the name “Phillips & Cohen 
Associates, Ltd.,” and made no reference to an attorney.34  Nevertheless, 
the signature line used “Esq.” after the officer’s name and identified the 
officer as Executive Vice President.35  The court was not impressed by 
the consumer’s attempt to make the “Esq.” designation the defining 
feature of the signature line, finding instead that the officer’s title as 
Executive Vice President neutralized any impression resulting from the 
use of  “Esq.”36  One cannot fault the Rumpler court for finding for the 
defendant on this occasion, because unlike Clomon, the collection letter 
made no reference to an attorney, either on the letterhead or the signature 
line, and nothing in the letter itself feigned legal intervention.37 
In Rumpler, the consumer lost her battle because she relied on the 
slender reed of “Esq.,” which certainly was not inconsistent with the 
                                                          
 30.  See id. at 1320.  The collector made his impression using certain words.  He wanted the 
consumer to know that he was “suggesting” appropriate measures for collection, that he had 
“instructions” to pursue collection to the furthest extent he deemed appropriate, and that he had 
“scheduled” the account for immediate review.  Id. at 1320–21.  This was precise language, 
calculated to send a message of the attorney’s direct involvement in the ongoing process.  Id. at 
1321. 
 31.  Id. at 1320. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1320–21.  The court in Clomon made the point that “the use of an attorney’s signature 
on a collection letter implies that the letter is ‘from’ the attorney who signed it . . . [and that] the 
attorney directly controlled or supervised the process through which the letter was sent.”  Id. at 1321. 
 34.  219 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 35.  Id. at 253. 
 36.  Id. at 257.  Unlike the situation in Clomon, where the collector identified himself as “P.D. 
Jackson, Attorney-at-Law, General Counsel,” the letter in Rumpler was on the letterhead of Phillips 
& Cohen Associates, Ltd., but made no reference to an attorney or law firm.  Compare Clomon, 988 
F.2d at 1317, with Rumpler, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257. 
 37.  See Rumpler, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257. 
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functions performed by the collection firm.38  If a collection letter falls 
somewhere on the spectrum between Clomon and Rumpler, it is more 
difficult for a court to find a false representation of attorney involvement.  
In Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, the letterhead 
referred to law offices, but the letter itself indicated that it came from a 
collector.39  The signature block carried no individual signature; rather, 
the letter identified the sender as an Account Representative from The 
Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC.40 
There was no question that the collection letter lacked clarity.  It 
purported to be from a collector, yet the writer made several references 
to the law offices of a certain attorney, including guiding the debtor to 
send her payment there.41  Perhaps the defendant anticipated that the 
term “Account Representative” would neutralize the effect of those 
references, and thus would convince the court that the debtor could not 
reasonably get the wrong impression about the letter’s origin.42 
In Kistner, the Sixth Circuit, finding that the case fell somewhere 
between Clomon and Rumpler, reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the collector and remanded the case for a jury to 
determine whether the collection letter was deceptive and misleading.43  
Kistner seems much closer to Clomon, as the collector in Kistner left no 
stone unturned in emphasizing that the letter originated from a law firm.  
The letter advised that the consumer’s account had been referred “to this 
office,” which turned out to be that of attorney Michael P. Margelefsky.44  
The sender was also keen to point out that the consumer should send 
payment to Margelefsky’s law office.45  The defendant attempted to 
minimize the importance of the law office designation by including the 
title “Account Representative” in the signature block, even though the 
letter indicated that the representative resided within the same law 
                                                          
 38.  Id.  Even though “Esq.” appeared after the name of the firm’s representative on the 
signature line, the representative signed in his capacity as Executive Vice President and not as an 
attorney representing the firm.  Id. at 253. 
 39.  518 F.3d 433, 434–35 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 40.  Id. at 435. 
 41.  Id. at 434–35. 
 42.  See id. at 440 (noting that Margelefsky argued at trial that the inclusion of the title 
“Account Representative” played a significant role in diminishing a reader’s confusion). 
 43.  Id. at 440. 
 44.  Id. at 434.  It is significant that the letterhead referred to the “Law Offices of Michael P. 
Margelefsky, LLC,” because that was the place to which the consumer’s account was referred. Id. at 
435.  This would likely give the consumer the impression that he was dealing with an attorney.  Id. at 
440–41. 
 45.  Id. at 435. 
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office.46  Given these repetitive references to a law office, a consumer 
could hardly be expected to understand that she was dealing with a mere 
account representative.47 
In Greene v. Douglas, Knight & Associates, Inc. (In re Cheaves), the 
debtor argued that including “& Associates” in the collector’s name 
implied that the collector was a law firm.48  But as the court 
acknowledged, it would take some level of sophistication for a consumer 
to conclude that she was dealing with a law firm simply because of the 
designation “& Associates.”49  The Greene court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that such wording would mislead the least sophisticated 
consumer.50  There was no basis for the plaintiff’s assertion that only law 
firms could have associates, and in any event, such a designation would 
hardly mislead the least sophisticated consumer.51 
Another possibly misleading feature of the collection letter was the 
sender’s designation as “Subrogation Specialist.”52  The court was not 
convinced that such a title would mislead the least sophisticated 
consumer into thinking that an attorney had sent the letter, as the court 
itself admitted that it had no idea what the words Subrogation Specialist 
meant.53  One wonders about the collector’s motives because, although it 
is true that the sender did not say that he was an attorney, subrogation is 
usually used in a legal context, and the collector surely intended some 
impact with this term. 
                                                          
 46.  See id. at 439 (indicating that the trial court accepted the argument that the inclusion of the 
title “Account Representative” eliminated confusion). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  439 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010).  The plaintiff argued that the wording “& 
Associates” is “most commonly associated with law firms.”  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 226. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id.  The court in Zaborac v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Ltd. also found that the use of the 
word “associates” in the defendant’s name did not constitute a false representation that the defendant 
was an attorney.  330 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  The Zaborac court reached this 
conclusion following the unsophisticated consumer standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit.  Id.  
Because the “& Associates” title passed the unsophisticated consumer test in Zaborac, it should 
come as no surprise that it also passed the least sophisticated consumer test applied in Greene.  See 
supra note 17 (explaining the two standards). 
 52.  Greene, 439 B.R. at 226. 
 53.  Id. 
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B. The Effect of a Disclaimer 
The FDCPA prohibits a collector from misleading a consumer about 
meaningful attorney involvement.54  However, a collector can certainly 
avoid any ambiguity about an attorney’s role in the collection process by 
using appropriate language to explain the extent of an attorney’s 
involvement in a particular case.  In Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, 
L.L.P., the defendant’s collection letter disclaimed as follows: “At this 
time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.”55  The letter left nothing to chance.  
There was no pretense that the law firm had exercised its legal judgment 
about the merits of the particular claim, and no language in the letter 
contradicted the disclaimer of attorney involvement.56  The court could 
find no evidence of a false representation that the communication was 
from someone acting as an attorney.57 
The intent of the disclaimer was to clarify for the consumer that the 
law firm was acting not in a legal capacity when it sent the collection 
letter, but rather as a collector.58  Despite this, the court should have 
given more weight to the letter’s introductory language that identified the 
defendant as a law partnership retained to collect a debt for its client and 
to the letterhead, which left no doubt about the firm’s identity.59  This 
information preceded the disclaimer,60 which in the scheme of things, 
                                                          
 54.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). 
 55.  412 F.3d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 56.  See id. at 365 (stating that defendants’ letter could not reasonably be interpreted as 
misleading).  Contrast Greco with the context in Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, where there was no 
language to counteract the impression that the debtor’s case had received an attorney’s full attention.  
See 321 F.3d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the contents of the letter).  The Greco court had the 
advantage of both the Miller and Clomon formulations about meaningful attorney involvement.  It 
was incumbent upon the attorney to send a proper message to erase doubt about whether she reached 
the required level of involvement in the transaction as an attorney.  The Miller court reflected on the 
importance of an attorney’s signature: “[T]he use of an attorney’s signature implies—at least in the 
absence of language to the contrary—that the attorney signing the letter formed an opinion about 
how to manage the case of the debtor to whom the letter was sent.”  Miller, 321 F.3d at 301 (quoting 
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1321 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 57.  Greco, 412 F.3d at 365. 
 58.  See id. (describing the content of the disclaimer). 
 59.  The first paragraph of the collection letter read as follows: 
The firm of Trauner, Cohen & Thomas is a law partnership representing financial 
institutions in the area of creditors[’] rights.  In this regard, this office represents the 
above named BANK OF AMERICA who has placed this matter, in reference to an 
original account . . . for collection and such action as necessary to protect our client. 
Id. at 366. 
 60.  Id.  The disclaimer itself preceded the firm’s admonition that its client might consider 
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may have taken a back seat in the consumer’s mind when compared with 
the firm’s specialty of representing collectors. 
Although the disclaimer prevailed in Greco, this does not mean that 
a Greco-type disclaimer will always shield a defendant from liability, 
because its placement can affect a court’s assessment of its impact.  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez v. Kay found that the consumer 
had stated a claim for relief where the disclaimer was placed on the back 
of the collection letter rather than in the body of the letter where the 
consumer could easily read the entire collection message.61  The Fifth 
Circuit tried in vain to construe this disclaimer—which was conveniently 
disconnected from the main text—as effective.62 
In Gonzalez, the parties agreed that none of the attorneys in the Kay 
Law Firm had reviewed the plaintiff’s file or played any role in sending 
the collection letter.63  Nevertheless, one could not ignore the firm’s 
letterhead, which included a statement of the principal’s admission to 
practice in New York and Washington, D.C.64  The letter informed the 
consumer that the law office was handling the consumer’s account and 
instructed him to send payments to the Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay.65  
After these references to a law office, the letter finally invited the debtor 
to “see [the] reverse side for important information.”66  Only by looking 
at the reverse side could the consumer learn that the collector denied any 
attorney involvement in the details of the consumer’s debt.67  It was a 
                                                                                                                       
 
additional remedies if the debtor did not contact the firm.  Id. 
 61.  577 F.3d 600, 606–07 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a consumer reading the main text of 
the letter might not see the disclaimer on the back). 
 62.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit explained its position this way: 
The disclaimer on the back of the letter completely contradicted the message on the front 
of the letter—that the creditor had retained the Kay Law Firm and its lawyers to collect 
the debt.  That is, the disclaimer on the back may not have been effective.  There was also 
ample room on the front of the letter to include this disclaimer so as to clearly articulate 
to the consumer the nature of the law firm’s involvement.  Accordingly, this letter falls in 
that middle ground in which the letter is neither deceptive as a matter of law nor not 
deceptive as a matter of law.  Because the “least sophisticated consumer” reading this 
letter might be deceived into thinking that a lawyer was involved in the debt collection, 
the district court prematurely dismissed Gonzalez’s complaint. 
Id. at 607. 
 63.  Id. at 602. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  The disclaimer read as follows: “At this point in time, no attorney with this firm has 
personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account.”  Id.  The court may have been 
bothered by the fact that even though there was ample room on the front of the letter to 
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disclaimer in the Greco vein, but there was a serious question about 
whether it commanded the same attention from the least sophisticated 
consumer as that in Greco. 
A disclaimer does not always work, even when it seems that a law 
firm has done its best to invite a settlement with the debtor.  The 
disclaimer in Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C. reassured 
the debtor that no attorney had personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of his account,68 the intent being to allay the debtor’s fears 
about any pending litigation.  But the law firm had the benefit of its 
letterhead, which gave its message greater weight.69  Undoubtedly, the 
firm hoped that the disclaimer would neutralize the implication that an 
attorney had entered the picture with legal remedies in mind if the debtor 
did not settle the matter.70  The distinguishing feature in Lesher was that 
the disclaimer, like the one in Gonzalez, appeared on the back of the 
letter and contradicted the collection message on the front.71  The Lesher 
disclaimer was not strong or clear enough to counteract the message on 
the front that the creditor had retained the law firm to recover the debt.72  
This was a contradiction that the court would not tolerate.  The court 
apparently was more concerned with the position and the context of the 
disclaimer.  Even though the collection letter contained the statutorily 
required statement that the communication was from a debt collector, 
this was not sufficient to nullify the implication that the letter had come 
from an attorney acting as such. 
                                                                                                                       
 
accommodate the disclaimer, the defendant chose to put it on the back where it might not have the 
same impact.  See id. at 607 (explaining that the letter might deceive the least sophisticated 
consumer).  The Greco disclaimer was effective because it appeared conspicuously on the front of 
the letter.  Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, 412 F.3d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 2 DEE 
PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT & THE LAW § 12:27 (2011–2012 ed.) 
(stating that “[a] debt collection letter . . . may not falsely overstate or imply the amount of attorney 
involvement in the preparation of the letter”); 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT 
COLLECTION § 5.5.6.3 (7th ed. 2011) (observing that “[i]n the Kay letter, the disclaimer was stuck on 
the back of the dunning letter following other disclaimers that were in legalese and thus would not 
be as effective as disclaimers”). 
 68.  650 F.3d 993, 995 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 69.  The letterhead identified the firm as the “Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C.” in large 
letters at the top of the page.  Id. 
 70.  See Greco, 412 F.3d at 364–65 (discussing how the construction of a letter bearing a firm’s 
letterhead can imply the firm’s level of involvement). 
 71.  See Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1001–02 (“[T]he main . . . difference between the cases is whether 
the letter included a clear, prominent, and conspicuous disclaimer that no lawyer was involved in the 
debt collection at that time.” (quoting Gonzales, 577 F.3d at 606)). 
 72.  The court noted that the disclaimer contradicted the message on the front of the letter that 
“the creditor retained a law firm to collect the debt.”  Id. at 1003 (footnote omitted). 
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Even if a collection letter contains a disclaimer in its text, a court 
may still find a false representation that a communication is from an 
attorney.  The law firm in Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C. must have 
been confident about the effect of its disclaimer, which it routinely 
disclosed in the third paragraph of its collection letter.73  That disclaimer 
did not dominate the entire paragraph because the firm included 
additional language that raised the possibility of judicial remedies if the 
consumer did not communicate with the law firm.74  The letter also 
threatened immediate suit at the creditor’s behest.75 
The court viewed the disclaimer as not blunting the impact of other 
language in the letter that emphasized the judicial remedies available if 
the consumer did not comply with the collector’s demands.76  The 
placement of the disclaimer in the body of the collection letter did not 
insulate the defendant from liability because the letter itself was laden 
with references to the law firm’s role in providing a legal solution to the 
problem, and the firm wanted to make sure that the consumer would not 
forget its overall threat of legal action.77 
The collection letters in Robertson v. Richard J. Boudreau & 
Associates, LLC78 contained an even stronger message of attorney 
involvement.  Leaving nothing to chance, the law firm sent three letters 
to the debtor on its letterhead, each containing clear language about the 
firm’s role in the collection process.79  The first letter set the stage with 
the following language: “This law firm has been retained.”80  It was not 
the type of communication that merely reminded the consumer of an 
outstanding obligation; instead, it conveyed the impression that the 
                                                          
 73.  653 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (D. Or. 2009). 
 74.  The third paragraph of the collection letter read as follows: “As of this date, no attorney 
with Derrick E. McGavic, P.C. has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your 
account.  However, if you do not communicate with this office, the firm’s client, Capital One Bank 
(USA), N.A., may consider judicial remedies to recover the claim from you.”  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  The disclaimer in Dunn, like that in Greco, appeared in the body of the collection letter.  Id.  
The court in Dunn, however, contrasted the five straightforward sentences in Greco with the 
convoluted nature of the Dunn letter.  Id. at 1114.  The letter also referred to the balance due as a 
“claim” rather than a “debt.”  Id.  Overall, the tone of the letter in Dunn compared unfavorably to the 
simplicity of the Greco message.  Id.  The emphasis on judicial remedies also concerned the court in 
Dunn.  Id. at 1114–15.  The letter sent a false message that an attorney had made some legal 
assessment of the debt.  Id. at 1114. 
 77.  Id. at 1114–15. 
 78.  No. C09–1681 BZ, 2009 WL 5108479 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
 79.  Id. at *2. 
 80.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
GRIFFITH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:11 PM 
192 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
transaction had reached a level meriting legal intervention.81  Two of the 
firm’s letters also emphasized that the firm’s review would determine 
whether a valid legal dispute existed, and still another letter used familiar 
phrases like “valid legal defense” and “cost of litigation.”82 
Robertson was another case where the defendant relied on a Greco-
type disclaimer to defend against a debtor’s allegation that the letters 
deceptively implied attorney involvement.83  The disclaimer seemed 
perfunctory when considered in context.84  The other language in the 
letters overshadowed the disclaimer because it would lead the least 
sophisticated consumer to contemplate the possibility of a lawsuit if she 
did not act promptly to resolve the matter.85 
Sometimes simplicity is a winning strategy for a collector.  In Taylor 
v. Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC, the collection letter not only contained 
a disclaimer of attorney involvement, but it was also short and concise.86  
The letter hinted at no claims or litigation and included the usual 
validation notice that assured the debtor of his right to challenge the 
debt.87  The letter avoided surplusage and did not attempt to embellish 
                                                          
 81.  See id. (noting that the letters imply impending legal action). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  The Robertson disclaimer harks back to Greco by stipulating that “no attorney with this 
firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account.”  Id. 
 84.  See id. (noting that the other content in the letters contradicted and overshadowed the 
disclaimer). 
 85.  The combination of phrases in the three collection letters convinced the court of a § 
1692e(3) violation.  The word “retained” signaled that the attorney was hired to do legal work.  Id.  
Then the second and third letters reminded the consumer that the law firm must determine whether 
there was a “valid legal dispute.”  Id.  The last letter completed the picture with references to “valid 
legal defense,” “cost of litigation,” and “non-litigious resolution.”  Id.  In the court’s view, the 
language became “increasingly aggressive.”  Id. at *3.  As a result, it violated § 1692e(5) because 
the firm’s attorneys, not being admitted in California, could not bring the legal action they 
threatened.  Id.  Of course, the threat of litigation need not be explicit.  See Baker v. G.C. Servs. 
Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that creating the impression that legal action is a 
real possibility constitutes a threat to take legal action). 
 86.  No. C-10-05164 JCS, 2011 WL 1303430, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2011).  The first 
paragraph of the letter contained the attorney’s substantive demand for payment, and the other 
material that followed repeated the usual validation notice required by § 1692g: 
This office represents the above named client, PINNACLE CREDIT SERVICES, LLC, 
who has placed the above-styled matter for collection.  This is a demand for full payment 
because you have had ample time to pay your creditor.  Sometimes we can arrange 
installment payments but you must contact this office for arrangements.  At this time, no 
attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your 
account.  Please issue payment to APM financial. 
Id. at *3. 
 87.  Id. 
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the demand for payment.88  In this respect, it was different from the 
Robertson language in which the threat of legal action overshadowed the 
disclaimer.89  Taylor illustrates what can happen when a collector avoids 
escalating messages. 
C. The Necessary Connection 
A collector is liable for making a false or misleading representation 
only if it does so “in connection with the collection of any debt.”90  It is 
not always easy to establish such a connection; that question usually 
comes down to whether the collector would have contacted the consumer 
in the absence of an outstanding debt.  The collector can clarify its 
purpose for making contact by mentioning the debt in its communication 
with the consumer.  Occasionally, though, the collection letter does not 
expressly demand payment, and a court must interpret the 
communication between the collector and the consumer. 
In Bailey v. Security Servicing Corp., the mortgage servicer’s letter 
merely reminded the consumers about their obligation to make their 
payments pursuant to a forbearance agreement and listed the amounts 
due for the next four payments.91  The servicer also reminded the 
consumers about the consequences of late payments.92  The court found 
that the servicer had made no communication in connection with the 
collection of a debt because the forbearance agreement was intact and the 
consumers had missed no payments under the new agreement.93  Because 
there was no default when the servicer sent the letter, the consumers 
could not show a connection between the letter and debt collection.94 
Bailey does not require an explicit demand for payment for there to 
be a communication in connection with collection of a debt, but yet it 
                                                          
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Contrast the succinct demand for payment in Taylor with the increasingly aggressive 
language in the three letters in Robertson.  Compare id., with Robertson, 2009 WL 5108479, at *2. 
 90.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006). 
 91.  154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998).  The letter stated as follows: 
We wish to work with you on the resolution of your delinquency and will allow you to 
continue to make the payments remaining under this agreement.  However, sending less 
than the forbearance payment amount and late payment of your monthly installment may 
render this agreement null and void requiring immediate payment in full of all sums due 
under the terms of your Note. 
Id. at 386. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 388–89. 
 94.  Id. 
GRIFFITH FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:11 PM 
194 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
does not prevent a collector from reminding a consumer about the 
consumer’s future payments, instead of her defaulted debts.95  It would 
have been unfortunate had the Bailey court found the servicer liable for a 
violation, given the circumstances of the servicer’s approach to the 
consumer.  The prohibition against unfair tactics in getting the 
consumer’s attention should not prevent a servicer from using its best 
efforts to convince the consumer of the seriousness of her commitment.  
The absence of a demand does not always mean that there is no 
communication in connection with the collection of debt; it was just one 
of the relevant factors in Bailey that led to the defendant’s exoneration.96 
The search for a connection between a collector’s communication 
and the collection of a debt can prove difficult.  It is important to 
examine not only the context of the communication, but also the 
relationship between the parties.  In Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, the 
collector sent a traditional collection letter, but complicated matters by 
including in the same envelope a privacy notice that expressed the 
collector’s willingness to share information about the debtor with third 
parties to the extent permitted by law.97  The collection letter seemed 
innocent enough, and the consumer had no complaint about it; however, 
the privacy notice did concern the consumer, as the collector left open 
the possibility of sharing the consumer’s private information with others 
                                                          
 95.  The court observed that the letter demanded nothing and gave no impression that any 
payment under the forbearance agreement was overdue.  Id. at 389.  The classic collection letter 
makes a demand for payment.  See, e.g., Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(requiring loan to be paid in full); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501–02 (7th Cir. 1997) (setting 
forth example of a collection letter that demands payment but also explains the consumer’s 
validation rights under § 1692g); Grambart v. Global Payments Check Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 
10-4399 (DSD/JJK), 2011 WL 124230, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2011) (holding that letter 
responding to consumer’s request for statement of account was not sent in connection with collecting 
debt); South v. Midwestern Audit Servs., Inc., Civil No. 09-14740, 2010 WL 5089862, at *6 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 8, 2010) (holding that letter notifying consumer that balance was going to be transferred 
was not sent in connection with collection of debt); Francis v. GMAC Mortg., No. 06-CV-15777-
DT, 2007 WL 1648884, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 6, 2007) (finding that letter sent in response to 
consumer’s inquiry was not sent in connection with collection of debt). 
 96.  In Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, there was no demand for payment.  614 F.3d 380, 
386 (7th Cir. 2010).  However, the consumer’s debt was in default, and one of the defendant’s letters 
offered to discuss foreclosure alternatives and repayment options.  Id.  Another letter encouraged the 
consumer to contact the sender to discuss settlement options.  See id.  Yet another letter the loan 
servicers sent to a firm requested the firm to collect financial information from the consumer to 
evaluate foreclosure alternatives.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit held that these contacts were made in 
connection with collection of a debt even though there was no specific demand for payment.  Id. at 
386–87.  The court acknowledged that “[t]he absence of a demand for payment was just one of 
several factors that influenced the outcome in Bailey.”  Id. at 385. 
 97.  577 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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unless the consumer opted out.98  The defendants knew that a collector 
had no right to disclose to third parties any information about a debtor 
without the debtor’s consent99 and attempted to minimize their threat of 
disclosure with the words “to the extent permitted by law.”100  
Nevertheless, those words implied that a collector could, under some 
circumstances, disclose private information about the consumer.101  
Although there was no such leeway under the law, the privacy notice 
served its purpose by creating the impression that the defendants could 
share the information that they had obtained during their collection 
efforts.  The only relationship between the consumers and the defendants 
arose from collection activities, and the privacy notice could not stand in 
isolation to protect the defendants from the consumers’ claims under the 
FDCPA.102  The defendants wanted to enhance their chances of 
recovering the debt by mixing the two messages—one concerning 
collection and the other concerning disclosure of private information.  
The consumers would have read them together as an inducement to act 
on the debt, rather than suffer the indignity of having their information 
disclosed to others. 
In Bailey, there was no demand for payment, but there was a 
forbearance agreement preventing any communication with the debtor in 
connection with the collection of a debt.103  Similarly, in Gburek v. Litton 
Servicing LP, the servicer’s communication made no demand for 
payment, but instead offered the consumer the opportunity to discuss the 
alternatives to foreclosure and invited the consumer to submit certain 
financial information for consideration.104  The consumer was already in 
default on her loan when the servicer offered some hope of saving her 
home, conditioned on her submitting the requested financial 
                                                          
 98.  See id. (stating the relevant portion of the opt-out notice sent to plaintiffs). 
 99.  See id. at 802 (“[T]he defendants have suggested no set of circumstances under which the 
FDCPA would have permitted disclosure of the plaintiffs’ nonpublic information without their 
consent.”). 
 100.  Id. at 801–02. 
 101.  Id. at 802.  In Smith v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., the collector indicated to the 
consumer that it does not disclose information about customers to anyone, “except as permitted by 
law.”  No. 08-CV-5626, 2009 WL 1675078, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2009).  The court found a 
violation of § 1692e because the least sophisticated consumer “is not expected to know there is a law 
that prevents defendants from performing the disclosures they otherwise indicate they will perform.”  
Id. at *3 (quoting Chapman v. Worldwide Asset Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 04C7625, 2005 WL 818880, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102.  Ruth, 577 F.3d at 799. 
 103.  Bailey v. Sec. Nat’l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384, 388–89 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 104.  614 F.3d 380, 382–83 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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information.105  The servicer then turned to a third party to communicate 
with the plaintiff about the possibilities of a loan workout.106  Even 
though the third-party facilitator made it clear in its communication with 
the debtor that it had no authority to accept mortgage payments,107 it was 
obvious that its purpose in contacting the debtor was to induce her to 
come to an agreement accommodating the servicer.108  The third party 
was acting on behalf of the servicer when it sent its letter to the debtor, 
reinforcing its role in promoting options for settling the debt.109 
Not every communication between a collector and a consumer will 
be in connection with the collection of a debt.  In Grden v. Leiken Ingber 
& Winters, PC, a consumer contacted the collector about the loan 
balance after the collector had served the consumer with a complaint 
about the outstanding debt.110  The consumer requested written proof 
about the balance, and the collector sent him a ledger statement listing an 
incorrect amount.111  As a result, the consumer alleged that the collector 
made a false statement in connection with the collection of a debt.112 
The consumer in Grden relied on Gburek for support because the 
collector in both cases had initially communicated with the consumer 
only because it was trying to collect a debt.113  Similarly in Ruth, the 
collectors claimed a legal right to disclose nonpublic information as a 
result of their attempt to collect a debt.114  However in Grden, the 
consumer initiated the contact and invited the collector to send written 
proof of the outstanding balance.115  The Grden court saw the consumer’s 
invitation and the collector’s subsequent submission of inaccurate ledger 
figures as independent acts not done in connection with the collection of 
                                                          
 105.  See id. at 383 (requesting information for assistance in making an arrangement). 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 386. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  643 F.3d 169, 171 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Compare Gburek, 614 F.3d at 385 (citing Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., 333 F.3d 769, 
774 (7th Cir. 2003)) (finding that “a communication made specifically to induce the debtor to settle 
[the] debt will be sufficient to trigger the protections of the FDCPA.”), with Grden, 643 F.3d at 173 
(finding that the purpose of defendant’s statements was not to induce payment but rather to respond 
to debtor’s inquiry). 
 114.  See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he defendants had no 
other relationship with the plaintiffs and therefore had no foreseeable prospect of obtaining 
nonpublic information in any other way.”).  
 115.  Grden, 643 F.3d at 171.  In response to the consumer’s request, the collector sent him a 
letter with an attached ledger card stating the balance due.  Id. 
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the debt.116  Although it is true that a collector and a consumer will 
normally communicate only because the former is trying to collect a 
debt, it does not follow that once they have established a relationship, all 
subsequent communications must be in connection with collection of the 
debt.  It is entirely possible for the parties to communicate subsequently 
without the collector treading on collection issues. 
Such was the nature of the communication in Francis v. GMAC 
Mortgage, where the collector merely acknowledged in writing the 
consumer’s denial of the debt, then followed up with a second letter 
seeking further information about an alleged settlement agreement 
between the consumer and the previous owner of the debt.117  The court 
noted that the collector’s two letters were akin to a “customer service 
response, rather than a debt collection demand.”118 The letters did not 
mention anything about payment or collection proceedings, references 
that one would expect to find in a communication relating to the 
collection of a debt.119  The connection, therefore, must depend on more 
than a casual conveyance of information relating only incidentally to the 
debt.120  If the drafters of the FDCPA intended to cover all 
communications between a collector and a consumer, they could easily 
have done so, and any exchange between the parties would be subject to 
the statute. 
III. THE IMPACT OF LANGUAGE 
A. Impressing the Debtor 
A collector’s challenge is to convince a consumer of the seriousness 
of the collector’s demands without violating the FDCPA.  Once the 
collector creates the impression of attorney involvement, a consumer will 
                                                          
 116.  See id. at 173 (“The statements were merely a ministerial response to a debtor inquiry, 
rather than part of a strategy to make payment more likely.”).  This was reminiscent of the situation 
in Bailey v. Security National Servicing Corp., where the collection letter simply recited the current 
status of the debtor’s account.  154 F.3d 384, 388–89 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 117.  No. 06-CV-15777-DT, 2007 WL 1648884, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 6, 2007). 
 118.  Id. at *4. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. (“Although the letters were sent by a debt collector and, therefore, perhaps remotely 
related to Plaintiff’s alleged debt, the letters were, in context, undisputedly sent in response to an 
inquiry made by Plaintiff.”).  Even so, the second letter related to a potential discharge of the debt, 
rather than its collection.  Id.; see also Salsbury v. Trac A Chec, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942 (C.D. 
Ill. 2005) (holding that collector’s telephone calls were not in connection with collection of debt 
when they merely confirmed consumer’s legal representation). 
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probably react differently to the collection letter.  This is why a collector 
that uses language designed to get the consumer thinking about legal 
confrontation should consider the impact that such language will have on 
the least sophisticated consumer.121  It is reasonable to raise questions 
about a collector’s intent when the collection letter indicates that it 
comes from a legal department.122  If the legal department has no 
attorneys, one may wonder whether such a reference is a part of the 
collector’s strategy to convince the consumer that an attorney had a hand 
in drafting the collection letter.123  Such a reference might be misleading 
to a consumer under § 1692e(3) because the sender ultimately wants the 
consumer to contemplate the legal ramifications of the communication.  
The letter does not mute the misleading nature of the message by merely 
including the statement that the communication is from a collector.124  
The statute requires such a statement, and there is nothing inconsistent 
about including the mandatory statement while also extolling one’s role 
as an attorney in the same communication. 
In Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., the collector must have been aware of 
the message that the designation “Legal Department” would send to the 
consumer.125  A consumer could have inferred that the letter had come 
from an attorney even though the department where it originated 
contained only nonattorneys.126  It seems reasonable that such a 
department would handle legal matters, and a consumer’s musing about 
                                                          
 121.  See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a disclaimer  of 
attorney involvement on back of letter may not have been effective and thus district court should not 
have dismissed claim; letter written on firm letterhead was insufficient to notify the least 
sophisticated consumer that no attorney had reviewed the case); Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 
218, 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the term “Legal Department” does not create the same 
impression as firm letterhead); Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 95 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that, to the least sophisticated consumer, an attorney’s signature on a letter 
creates the impression that an attorney oversaw and personally reviewed the letter before it was 
sent). 
 122.  See Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 224 (finding that “the phrase ‘Legal Department’ could imply to 
the least sophisticated debtor that a lawyer was involved in drafting or sending the letter”). 
 123.  See id. (reversing the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remanding to 
the district court to give plaintiff a chance to prove his case).  
 124.  Section 1692e(11) requires a collection letter to state that the communication is from a 
collector.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006).  That statutory requirement does not necessarily detract 
from the implication that a letter comes from an attorney acting as such. 
 125.  539 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2008) (taking the view that under the least sophisticated 
consumer standard, the collection letter could reasonably be read as having two different meanings, 
one of which was inaccurate). 
 126.  See id. at 224 (noting that “Legal Department” could imply an attorney’s involvement in 
drafting or sending the letter). 
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the role of an attorney in that department is not bizarre under those 
circumstances. 
A collector can get a consumer’s attention by using language that 
suggests some sort of legal review of the consumer’s file is taking place.  
In Adams v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, questionable language 
appearing under the heading, “Notice of Legal Review and Settlement 
Option,” provided that the creditor’s assignee had prescreened and 
reviewed the debtor’s account “to be forwarded to an Attorney’s office 
licensed in the state of New Jersey.”127  The collector strategically placed 
the caption to convey the impression that an attorney had already done 
the necessary review so that when the debtor received the letter she 
would understand that the transaction had taken a serious turn.128  But the 
“Legal Review” heading did not tell the whole story, for the text of the 
letter explained that the debtor’s account might be forwarded to an 
attorney if the debtor did not make the necessary arrangements for 
payment.129  This narrative therefore contemplated future legal review if 
the collector chose to forward the file to an attorney.130  Adams illustrates 
that a court should not read a caption or heading in isolation, but instead 
should examine the text of the letter to determine whether an attorney 
reviewed the letter before it was sent out.131  In Adams, the term “Legal 
Review” did not make the letter false or misleading because it indicated 
that the creditor’s assignee—and not the creditor—had done the 
prescreening and review, with a view to subsequent attorney involvement 
if the debtor did not settle her account.132 
Sometimes it is merely a single word that puts the collector on the 
defense.  In Nelson v. Select Financial Services, Inc., the collector 
intended to impress the consumer by advising her that her failure to 
dispute the debt verified the validity of the debt.133  The collector 
intended to justify its future strategy by the consumer’s failure to respond 
to its prior notices, and thus wanted the consumer to know that her 
                                                          
 127.  777 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195 (D. Minn. 2011). 
 128.  See id. at 1196 (noting that this is how the debtor interpreted the letter). 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See id. “Language in a debt-collection letter cannot be viewed in isolation; the letter must 
be viewed ‘as a whole’ to determine whether it runs afoul of the FDCPA.”  Id. (citing Jones v. CBE 
Grp., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 558, 566 (D. Minn. 2003)); see also Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 
F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the collector’s statement that its only alternative was 
service by constable was not literally false when considered in context). 
 132.  Adams, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 1196. 
 133.  430 F. Supp. 2d 455, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
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intransigence had confirmed what the collector had claimed all along.134  
The collector was obviously thinking of § 1692g(a)(3), which allows the 
collector to assume that the debt is valid if the consumer does not dispute 
its validity within thirty days after receiving a validation notice.135  But, 
the statutory assumption that the debt is valid in the absence of the 
consumer’s dispute is a far cry from a statement that the consumer 
verifies the debt’s validity.  The statute merely creates a temporary legal 
fiction that the consumer indeed owes the debt so that the collector can 
continue its collection efforts with some degree of confidence.136 
The collection letter in Nelson falsely represented that the 
consumer’s failure to respond would verify the validity of the debt.137  
The collector sought to give the consumer’s inaction more significance 
than it deserved, for the statute itself provides that the consumer’s failure 
to dispute the validity of the debt should not be construed as a 
consumer’s admission of liability.138  The use of the term “verifies” in 
the collection letter sent a false message that the consumer confirmed or 
substantiated the validity of the debt, despite saying nothing about it.139  
It was a message calculated to convince the consumer that she was 
legally responsible for the debt, even though the statute does not penalize 
a consumer for silence in the face of the collector’s demands.140 
                                                          
 134.  The collection letter stated in part: “You are now being provided notice of our intentions 
after having been previously offered sufficient opportunity to dispute the validity of this debt.”  Id. 
 135.  The FDCPA requires a collector to give the consumer a written notice containing certain 
information.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2006).  Among other requirements, the collector must provide 
“a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 
collector.”  Id. § 1692g(a)(3). 
 136.  See Nelson, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (“[A]ssumed and verifies are not synonyms: assumed 
conveys that Select pretends or takes for granted that Nelson’s debt is valid for purposes of further 
collection efforts, while ‘verifies’ conveys that Nelson’s inaction for thirty days demonstrates or 
substantiates the truth of the debt.”); see also Smith v. Hecker, No. Civ.A. 04-5820, 2005 WL 
894812, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 18, 2005) (stating that § 1692g(a)(3) allows a collector to continue 
collection activities under “the temporary fiction the debt is correct as stated in the validation 
notice.”). 
 137.  See Nelson, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 456. 
 138.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c). 
 139.  See Nelson, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 458. 
 140.  See Gigli v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., No. 3:CV-06-1428, 2008 WL 3853295, at *6 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) (stating that “a consumer’s failure to dispute the validity of a debt will not 
bar her from defending against a subsequent debt collection lawsuit.”); Velderman v. Midland Credit 
Mgmt., No. 1:04-CV-269, 2005 WL 2405959, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2005) (finding violation 
where collector misrepresented to consumer that consumer was legally responsible for debt because 
of failure to dispute debt under § 1692g); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 
1215, 1227 (D. Kan. 2003) (stating that collector was not entitled to summary judgment just because 
consumers did not dispute the validity of the debt). 
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Many collectors couch their demands for payment in terms that leave 
the consumer unsure about the collector’s message.  It is in the 
collector’s interest to convince the consumer that her failure to respond 
to the collector’s demands will result in a judgment against the 
consumer, with ensuing unpleasantness and discomfort.  It is not 
unusual, therefore, for a collector to use language that suggests a lawsuit 
is imminent and that the consumer can prevent litigation by coming to an 
agreement with the collector.141 
There are many variations on this theme.  Crossley v. Lieberman142 is 
an early example of a collector’s strategy to unsettle the consumer about 
what lay ahead.  There, an attorney sent a letter to the consumer 
demanding “immediate payment of the full amount of the plaintiff’s 
damages and costs.”143  The letter also identified the creditor as 
“plaintiff,” thereby suggesting that the transaction was already in 
litigation and that the consumer could conclude matters only by making 
full payment within one week.144  The attorney collector knew that there 
could be no plaintiff and costs until he had filed a lawsuit.145  The 
attorney also knew that the mere mention of a one-week deadline, 
combined with the reference to a sheriff’s sale, would cause the 
consumer to think that she had to act quickly to avoid foreclosure, even 
though the local statute required a lender to give the consumer at least 
thirty days’ notice of any pending action.146  The attorney intended to 
signal that he would sue the consumer if she did not pay within one 
week.  The message was one of inevitability, but it was false and 
misleading.147 
                                                          
 141.  See Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding letter 
that falsely stated that collector had authority to begin legal proceedings implied legal action was 
imminent); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that 
“[t]he clear import of the language, taken as a whole, is that some type of legal action has already 
been or is about to be initiated and can be averted from running its course only by payment.”); 
Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding letter clearly implied legal action 
would begin if consumer did not pay within a week). 
 142.  868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 143.  Id. at 567. 
 144.  Id. at 571. 
 145.  See id. (noting that the collector’s “word choice was carefully calculated to suggest to the 
consumer that she was in the midst of a suit.”). 
 146.  The Pennsylvania statute required a collector give at least thirty days’ notice to a debtor 
that the collector intends to foreclose.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(a) (West 1988). 
 147.  The attorney also failed to inform the debtor about her right to cure the default.  Crossley, 
868 F.2d at 571 (citing 41 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 403(c)). 
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A collection message will usually have greater impact on a consumer 
if the collector conveys it on law firm letterhead.  This is not to say that 
every collection letter carries an implied threat that the attorney will sue, 
but an attorney nonetheless knows that ambiguity can convey an empty 
threat of litigation even when she does not intend to follow through, or in 
fact cannot, because of legal impediments.148  Therefore, when it is 
unclear whether a collection letter threatens suit, the mere fact that it 
comes from an attorney makes it more likely to convince a consumer that 
litigation will ensue.  It is not enough, however, for a collection letter to 
indicate a lawsuit is a mere possibility.149  A letter on law firm letterhead, 
however, may have a stronger impact when it indicates that the firm has 
been retained to collect a debt and that the consumer must either pay the 
full amount due or call the law firm to make arrangements.150  The 
message is more powerful still when the collector indicates its desire to 
make contact about an important legal matter.151  The attorney’s unique 
ability to sue lends an attorney’s letter the prominence it enjoys in the 
collection process.152  Even when a letter comes from a nonattorney 
collector, it may instill the same fear if it falsely threatens the 
intervention of independent counsel, thus motivating a consumer to settle 
a debt that may not be hers, rather than prolong the agony of the 
collector’s pursuit.153 
                                                          
 148.  The FDCPA specifically forbids “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken 
or that is not intended to be taken.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (2006); see Wilhelm v. Credico, 519 F.3d 
416, 419 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that categorical threat to sue violated § 1692e(5) when collector 
knew that it would not sue any consumers who disputed debt under § 1692g); Gervais v. Riddle & 
Assocs., 479 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274–75 (D. Conn. 2007) (holding that threat of litigation violated § 
1692e(5) when action on debt was time-barred); Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805 
(S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding that collector violated § 1692e(5) by threatening to take action that he did 
not intend to take). 
 149.  See Madonna v. Acad. Collection Serv., Inc., No. 3:95CV00875 (AVC), 1997 WL 530101, 
at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 1997) (finding that a statement that a collector “may choose to pursue legal 
action” did not violate § 1692e(5)); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 178 
(W.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that collector’s language that “legal action may be necessary” did not 
violate § 1692e(5)). 
 150.  Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300–01, 304 (2d Cir. 2003); Nielson 
v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 2002); Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 2d 
1109, 1114 (D. Or. 2009). 
 151.  See United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136–38 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding 
that attorney’s letter illegally threatened lawsuit); Gervais, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (noting that the 
collector’s telephone messages indicated that collector was calling about an important legal matter); 
Russey v. Rankin, 911 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.N.M. 1995) (holding that collection letter threatened 
litigation when attorney sending it falsely declared he had the legal right to sue). 
 152.  See Gervais, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (emphasizing the effect that the possibility of a lawsuit 
has on a debtor). 
 153.  See Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 138 (finding § 1692e violation where collector falsely 
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B. Threat of Imminent Suit 
Sometimes even a masterful mix of language will get a collector in 
trouble.  In Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, the collector’s first 
letter informed the consumer that it had instructions “to proceed with 
whatever legal means [were] necessary to enforce collection.”154  A few 
days later, a second letter advised that the account had been referred to 
the collector’s desk for a decision about enforcing collection.155  That 
second letter concluded with references to post-judgment proceedings 
that might lead to attachment and garnishment—to say nothing about 
legal expenses and attorney’s fees.156  In the ordinary course of events, 
these letters would have left no doubt in the consumer’s mind about the 
collector’s intentions, inasmuch as the collector indicated to the 
consumer that it had authority to institute legal proceedings against 
her.157 
As it turned out in Bentley, the creditor did not confer any such 
authority on the collector, and therefore the collector created the false 
impression that it was about to sue the consumer.158  The collector 
alleged that it had unbridled discretion to use all legal means to achieve 
its objective;159 it is understandable that the consumer would sense the 
imminence of a lawsuit.160  According to the collector, there was nothing 
restraining it from seeking legal remedies against the consumer.161  The 
                                                                                                                       
 
threatened legal action when it stated that debtor’s account would be transferred to an attorney if it 
remained unpaid); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1461(C.D. Cal. 1991) 
(finding that “[t]he representation that independent counsel has been hired may unjustifiably frighten 
the unsophisticated debtor into paying a debt that he or she does not owe”). 
 154.  6 F.3d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 61–62. 
 157.  Id. at 62. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 61. 
 160.  The threat that a suit is imminent is an important element in § 1692e claims.  See Adams v. 
J.C. Christensen & Assocs., 777 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 (D. Minn. 2011) (stating that a collection 
letter that merely indicates that a matter may be referred to an attorney is not a violation); Dewees v. 
Legal Servicing, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 128, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that consumers stated a 
claim where collection letter indicated defendant might file litigation and that the debt was being 
reviewed for potential litigation); Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(stating that “[f]or a collection letter to threaten legal action . . . , it must communicate that a lawsuit 
is not merely a possibility, but that a decision to pursue legal action is either imminent or has already 
been made.”). 
 161.  See Bentley, 6 F.3d at 61–62 (noting that the collector’s letter did not contain any 
suggestion that there was a limitation on its ability to initiate suit). 
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so-called referral of the consumer’s account to the collector’s desk 
highlighted the collector’s message that plans for recovering the debt had 
reached a critical stage.162  The only problem was that the collector had 
no authority to bring suit, and the collector’s characterization of events 
would have led a consumer to believe that there was no way of avoiding 
the dire legal consequences flowing from the consumer’s delinquency.163  
As if to soften the blow, the second letter reflected the collector’s 
patience and understanding with the following language: “No legal 
action has been or is now being taken against you.”164  This was a master 
stroke; the collector obviously wanted the consumer to understand that 
the latter presently enjoyed a temporary respite that might end suddenly 
in light of the collector’s existing authority to act as it saw fit.  In the 
final analysis, the language in the two letters proved deceptive.165 
There is, however, a difference between a collection letter that 
threatens legal action and one that merely describes legal remedies that 
may be available to the collector.  It is not unusual for a collector to 
indicate that it will continue its collection activities until the consumer 
pays her debt.166  A consumer may find this strategy objectionable in 
principle because the FDCPA gives her the right to dispute the debt in 
writing within thirty days, thus requiring the debt collector to cease its 
collection activities until it verifies the debt.167  In Peter v. GC Services 
L.P., the consumer claimed that it was misleading for the collector to 
feign continuous collection activity when it knew that the consumer 
could interrupt that strategy simply by disputing the debt.168  The Fifth 
Circuit explained, however, that the collector’s promise of continued 
collection activity was not the equivalent of a threat to sue the consumer 
                                                          
 162.  Id. at 62–63. 
 163.  Id. at 63. 
 164.  Id. at 62. 
 165.  Id. at 63. 
 166.  Even though a collector must advise a consumer that the consumer has a right to dispute 
the debt within thirty days, the collector may still continue its collection activities if the consumer 
does not dispute the debt in writing during that period.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2006).  A collector 
can still pursue the consumer because the thirty-day dispute period is not a grace period that prevents 
the collector from acting.  Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Computer Credit, 
Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Mezines, F.T.C. Adv. Op.  (March 31, 2000), 
2000 WL 34500216, at *2. 
 167.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).  Although a collector must advise the consumer that it will obtain 
verification of the debt if the consumer disputes it in writing, id. § 1692g(a)(4), the statute does not 
require the collector to notify the consumer that the consumer’s notice of dispute will stop the 
collector’s activities until the collector mails the verification to the consumer. 
 168.  310 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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within the thirty-day dispute period.169  There was nothing deceptive 
about the collector’s promise when the collector did not sue.170  The 
collection letter in Peter hardly contemplated legal action by the 
collector within the thirty-day dispute period, as it referred only to the 
possibility that the collector would make recommendations to the 
creditor about pursuing the most effective method for collection.171 
In the same vein, there is really no threat of legal action if the 
collector informs the consumer that it has the authority to continue its 
collection efforts until the consumer pays the debt.  The reference to 
collection efforts in Quamina v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, 
Inc.172 was similar to the collector’s promise in Peter that the debt 
collector would continue its activities until the consumer paid in full.173  
It was significant that in both of these cases the collectors were not 
attorneys, so that when they referred to their collection plans, they 
contemplated more letters, telephone calls, and communications with 
credit reporting agencies, rather than a future lawsuit.174  This is not to 
say that they would not ultimately engage attorneys, but that was 
certainly not their focus in the initial stages of their recovery effort.  The 
                                                          
 169.  Id.  The consumer argued that the collection letter was false or misleading under § 1692e 
because the collector would have had to suspend its collection activities if the consumer disputed the 
debt under § 1692g(a)(4), at least until it obtained verification of the debt.  Id.  However, the statute 
requires that “[a]ny collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not 
overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or 
request the name and address of the original creditor.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).  It is this conflict 
between the consumer’s validation rights and the collector’s collection rights that has always caused 
problems.  From the consumer’s perspective, full payment was the event that would end collection.  
The same result might ensue if the consumer disputed the debt and the debt collector did not respond 
to the consumer’s notice of dispute.  A collector can avoid any ambiguity by providing a specific 
statement about the suspension of collection activities if the consumer disputes the debt.  See, e.g., 
Lerner v. Foster, 240 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “[a]ll efforts to collect this 
debt will be suspended until we mail any required information to you”). 
 170.  Peter, 310 F.3d at 350. 
 171.  Id. at 350.  Although the consumer in Peter did not succeed in linking the collector’s 
review of the consumer’s account to any contradiction of the consumer’s validation rights, it is 
possible to do so in certain circumstances.  See Wilhelm v. Credico, Inc., 519 F.3d 416, 419 (8th Cir. 
2008) (holding that categorical threat to sue violated § 1692e when collector did not disclose 
consumer’s right to dispute debt); Gilmore v. Account Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:08–CV–1388–JOF–LTW, 
2009 WL 2848278, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2009) (holding that debt collector violated § 1692e(5) 
when it threatened to sue even though it failed to verify debt). 
 172.  No. 10–cv–01852 (ERK)(RER), 2011 WL 1099483 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011). 
 173.  The debt collector made its point: “You have apparently chosen to ignore all of our 
requests for payment.  However, be advised that our client has authorized us to continue our 
collection efforts until you have honored this outstanding obligation.”  Id. at *1. 
 174.  See id. at *2 (noting what actions collectors may take). 
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least sophisticated consumer therefore would not interpret the promise of 
collection activity as a threat of imminent suit.175 
The Bentley language was more definitive in the sense that it 
emphasized the collector’s authority to use “whatever legal means [were] 
necessary to enforce collection.”176  One can see how “legal means” 
might include legal action, and therefore the Bentley court concluded that 
this language left the impression that the collector threatened action that 
it did not intend to take.177  The collector could not follow through 
because it had no authority to sue.178  A slight variation in language led 
to the same result in Berger v. Suburban Credit Corp., in which the 
collector threatened to take “whatever steps necessary to pursue 
collection.”179  Although the Berger court recognized the language 
implied that “the commencement of legal action [was] a possible step,” it 
could find no authority for the collector to take “whatever steps 
necessary.”180  The Berger court therefore found that the collector 
violated § 1692e(5) because the collector lacked authority to follow 
through on its threat.181 
Some collectors thrive on ambiguity.  A lack of precision can leave a 
consumer confused about the collector’s plans.  When the collector in 
Brown v. Card Service Center indicated that the consumer’s failure to 
pay in five days “could” result in the file being sent to an attorney for 
continued collection efforts, the consumer became concerned that the 
                                                          
 175.  In Spira v. Ashwood Financial, Inc., a debt collector used the following language: “It is our 
intent to pursue collection of this debt through every means available to us.”  358 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
154 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  The court held that the collector did not violate § 1692e(5) because the 
consumer failed to show that the collector did not intend to carry out its threat.  Id. at 160.  The court 
recognized that the collector had many options, such as sending more collection letters, requesting 
payment, placing telephone calls, and forwarding claims to attorneys for litigation.  See id. at 160; 
see also Sparks v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (finding 
that “[m]erely advising the debtor of the agency’s options with which to pursue the debt is the sort of 
truism that is legally insufficient to violate § 1692e”). 
 176.  Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 177.  See id. at 62 (stating the least sophisticated consumer may interpret the language to mean 
legal action was “authorized, likely, and imminent”). 
 178.  See id. 
 179.  No. 04 CV 4006 CLP, 2006 WL 2570915, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 180.  Id. at *7.  The collector did not dispute the consumer’s contention that for debts of the size 
mentioned in Berger, the collector merely sent out notices to or telephoned the debtor.  Id. at *7.  It 
was not hard for the court to find a violation of § 1692e(5) because the collector threatened to take 
action that it did not intend to take.  Id.  The collector could hardly take “whatever steps necessary,” 
because its authority was limited.  Id.; see also Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 
22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding violation where collection letter stated that collector would take legal 
action “As Necessary And Appropriate To Secure Payment In Full”). 
 181.  Berger, 2006 WL 2570915, at *7. 
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collector would engage an attorney to increase the pressure.182  Despite 
the tone of the letter, the collector continued its own collection efforts, 
and the consumer complained that the collector never intended to involve 
an attorney.183 
On these facts, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in 
dismissing the consumer’s complaint because it would be deceptive for 
the collector to state that it could take an action that it had no intention of 
taking.184  The collector did not say that it would take any particular 
action, only that it could.185  There was a reasonable question as to 
whether the collector was referring to a mere possibility of a lawsuit or 
referral to an attorney.  If this reference related only to an option 
available to the collector, the court in Brown might have been persuaded 
that there was nothing misleading about the collection letter.  If, 
however, the collector never intended to refer these matters to an 
attorney for further action, there was never truly an option, and the 
plaintiff had the right to make his case.186 
Collectors can be as creative as they want to be with their collection 
message.  Nevertheless, they must always be careful not to use language 
that will mislead or deceive the consumer.  In their enthusiasm to draft 
language that can have two or more different meanings, some collectors 
                                                          
 182.  464 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2006).  The collection letter sent the following message: “You now 
have five (5) days to make arrangements for payment of this account.  Failure on your part to 
cooperate could result in our forwarding this account to our attorney with directions to continue 
collection efforts.”  Id. at 451–52. 
 183.  See id. at 452 (discussing consumer’s compliant that the letter was “designed to coerce and 
intimidate the consumer . . . by false threat”(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 184.  Id. at 455–56.  The FTC Official Staff Commentary provides the following guidance: 
A debt collector may state that certain action is possible, if it is true that such action is 
legal and is frequently taken by the collector or creditor with respect to similar debts; 
however, if the debt collector has reason to know there are facts that make the action 
unlikely in the particular case, a statement that the action was possible would be 
misleading.   
FTC Official Staff Commentary § 807(5)-3, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,106 (Dec. 13, 1988).  The 
Commentary is a guideline intended “to clarify the staff interpretations of the statute.”  FTC Official 
Staff Commentary (Introduction), 53 Fed. Reg. at 50,101 (Dec. 13, 1988).  It does not bind the FTC 
or the public because it is not a formal rule or advisory opinion.  Id. 
 185.  Brown, 464 F.3d at 451–52. 
 186.  See id. at 456 (discussing that the facts, if proven, entitle Brown to relief); see also United 
States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that collector had no 
intention of taking action); Leone v. Ashwood Fin., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 343, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that threat that collector’s action “may” result in suit being filed was deceptive under  
§ 1692e(5) because collector was not authorized to bring suit); Withers v. Eveland, 988 F. Supp. 
942, 946 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that by threatening to file suit, nonattorney collector violated  
§ 1692e(5) by threatening to take action that he could not legally take or that he did not intend to 
take).  
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run the risk that an inaccuracy will make the letter deceptive.  But, after 
all, that is exactly the collector’s objective: leave the consumer with an 
ambiguity. 
In Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, the collector tried to 
collect some debts that were so old that no consumer reporting agency 
could include them in a consumer report.187  The collector offered the 
consumer a settlement and, as an incentive, volunteered that “if [the 
collector was] reporting the account, the appropriate credit bureaus 
[would] be notified that this account [had] been settled.”188  This 
language was open to at least two interpretations.  If the collector was not 
reporting the account, there would be no need to report the settlement.189  
But the language also suggested that there were some circumstances that 
justified reporting the old delinquencies, and, therefore, the collector 
could report the good news that the parties had settled the account.190  
This second interpretation was legally impossible because a collector 
cannot report the outstanding debt after seven years.191  The collector was 
not about to set the record straight because it wanted to communicate to 
the consumer that he had everything to gain from a positive report about 
the settlement.  The implication was misleading, but the collector had no 
interest in clarifying matters for the consumer.  The consumer’s 
complaint was justified because one reasonable interpretation of the 
collection letter was that the collector would take action that was legally 
impermissible.192 
The collector in Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships engaged in a similar 
strategy when it included with its demand for payment a notice referring 
to its right to share private information about the consumer “to the extent 
permitted by law.”193  This was a message calculated to impress the 
                                                          
 187.  660 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides that a 
consumer reporting agency may not include in any consumer report “[a]ccounts placed for collection 
or charged to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven years.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a)(4) (2006). 
 188.  Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1059. 
 189.  Id. at 1063. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4). 
 192.  Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1063. 
 193.  577 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 2009).  The consumer could not prevail simply by alleging that 
the collector’s statements were false.  She also had to show that the statements deceived or misled 
her.  Id. at 800.  The Seventh Circuit did not require extrinsic evidence of deception in Ruth because 
it found the collection notice misleading on its face and treated the matter as a question of law.  Id. at 
801.  The court usually requires such extrinsic evidence and treats the matter as an issue of fact if the 
collector’s statements are not plainly misleading or deceptive.  See, e.g., Hahn v. Triumph P’ships, 
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consumer with the possibilities open to the collector for disclosing the 
debtor’s private information to others.  The phrase, “to the extent 
permitted by law,” created an ambiguity intended to induce the debtor to 
concede.  Clearly, the collector threatened action that it either had no 
intention of taking or could not legally take.194 
Similarly, the conditional language in Gonzales made the collection 
letter misleading because it threatened action that the collector could not 
legally take.195  The collector could make a positive report about the 
debtor’s settlement only if it had already filed a negative report about the 
outstanding debt.196  In reality, the collector could not make any kind of 
report on this stale debt, but the consumer likely would not know about 
this legal restriction.197  Therefore, to avoid the impact of a negative 
report, the least sophisticated consumer might have succumbed to the 
collector’s demands. 
The “if” clause at issue in Gonzalez contributed not only to the 
misleading nature of the collector’s communication, but also to the 
interpretation that the collector had made a threat to report an old debt to 
the credit bureaus.198  Although not all misleading statements constitute 
threats to take illegal action,199 misleading statements may constitute a 
violation of § 1692e(10), which prohibits deception.200  The Gonzales 
                                                                                                                       
 
557 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing need to introduce evidence); Evory v. RJM 
Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence is required).  
Other circuits treat the issue of deception as an issue of law or a mixed question of law and fact.  
See, e.g., Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1061 (treating liability as an issue of law); Kistner v. Law Offices of 
Michael Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the determination of 
whether defendant was a collector was “reduced to a pure question of law”); Peters v. Gen. Serv. 
Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055–56 (8th Cir. 2002) (exploring deception as a mixed question); 
Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the determination of whether 
collection language contradicts validation notice “does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic 
evidence”). 
 194.  Ruth, 577 F.3d at 801–02. 
 195.  See Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1064 (discussing the presence of an implied threat).  Section 
1692e(5) forbids a collector from making a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or 
that is not intended to be taken.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 
 196.  Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1064. 
 197.  See id. at 1064 & n.7 (emphasizing that the least sophisticated consumer would be unaware 
that a creditor “could not legally make any report on these obsolete debts.”). 
 198.  Id. at 1063. 
 199.  See id. at 1064 n.6 (stating “[a] ‘threat’ to take legal action that a debt collector has no 
intention (or ability) to take is necessarily deceptive or misleading, but not all deceptive or 
misleading statements constitute threats actionable under section [1692]e(5).”). 
 200.  See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that a violation of 
§ 1692e(5) is a per se violation of § 1692e(10)); United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 
138 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding a violation of § 1692e(5) and § 1692(10) where collector made false 
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scenario did not leave much room for the collector to avoid liability on 
this ground.201  It is true that the collector’s letter dealt only with the 
prospects of a positive report in the event of a settlement.202  There was 
no specific reference in the collection letter to a negative report, but the 
collector left no doubt that the consumer had to settle the matter to 
improve his credit standing. 
C. The Prospect of Settlement 
Some collectors try to conclude their collection efforts with an offer 
of settlement that remains outstanding for a limited time.  Such a strategy 
creates the impression that the collector is making a one-time settlement 
offer to the debtor that will not be revived after the time expires. 
The collector in Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc. 
knew that it had the authority to settle the consumer’s debt at a 30% 
discount at any time, yet it indicated in a settlement offer to the consumer 
that it was available to the consumer “only during the next thirty 
days.”203  The court recognized that the collector’s statement about the 
time limit was not only untrue, but also that it gave the impression that 
the settlement offer was a one-time affair that would expire in thirty 
days.204  The word “only” served as a definite restriction in Goswami, 
leaving little doubt about the collector’s intent to bring a close to the 
negotiations.205  Indeed, it was enough to lead the consumer to think that 
                                                                                                                       
 
threats to sue). 
 201.  A collector will always have problems when a collection letter can be interpreted in two 
different ways, one of which is inaccurate.  See Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, 
LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the ‘more than one reasonable interpretation’ 
standard is applicable to the entirety of § 1692e as a useful tool in analyzing the ‘least-sophisticated-
consumer’ test”); Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that a 
collection letter is deceptive where “it can be reasonably read to have two or more different 
meanings, one of which is inaccurate” (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(stating that courts have found notices deceptive when “they are open to more than one reasonable 
interpretation”). 
 202.  See Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1063 (holding that “the phrase ‘if we are reporting the account, 
the appropriate credit bureaus will be notified that this account has been settled’ is misleading”). 
 203.  See Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
the collector’s letter, “Effective immediately, and only during the next thirty days, will our client 
agree to settle your outstanding balance” at a discount). 
 204.  See id. at 496 (stating that a collection agency “may not be deceitful in the presentation of 
that settlement offer”). 
 205.  See id. at 495 (observing that “[t]he obvious purpose of the statement was to push 
Goswami to make a rapid payment to take advantage of the purported limited time offer”). 
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time was running out.  The problem was that the collector had the 
authority to give a discount at any time, and so the phrase “only during 
the next thirty days” conveyed a false message to the consumer, thus 
creating a deception that violated the FDCPA.206  The designation of 
“only” in Goswami carried the same weight as the “if” that introduced 
the conditional language in Gonzales.207  Moreover, the collector’s 
objectives were the same in both cases: to goad the consumer into action.  
There is nothing wrong in principle with that strategy, but the collector 
should not deceive the consumer with a false or misleading scenario. 
There is nothing to prevent a collector from making a genuine offer 
of settlement unaffected by misleading time restrictions or artificial 
conditions.  For instance, when the collector in Dupuy v. Weltman, 
Wienberg & Reis Co. made a settlement offer that was “good for fifteen 
(15) days from the date of [the] letter,” the court noted the difference 
between the one-time offer in Goswami and the offer in Dupuy, which 
made no reference to the possibility of future offers.208  This was a plain 
indication of the importance of the word “only” to the outcome in 
Goswami.209  The distinction between Goswami and Dupuy is quite 
reasonable.  One would not want to force a collector to make either an 
open-ended offer or one that, although having an expiration date, 
announces to the consumer that she can nevertheless expect a better offer 
in the future. 
A collector can clarify a settlement offer by indicating that it has no 
obligation to renew the current offer.  The Seventh Circuit suggested this 
                                                          
 206.  Id. at 496.  The phrase, “only during the next thirty days,” distinguishes Goswami from 
other decisions.  For example, in Johnson v. AMO Recoveries, the collection letter stated that “[t]his 
settlement offer shall be null and void if not received by 09-20-04.”  427 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954 (N.D. 
Cal 2005).  That language set a time limit on that participation offer without saying anything about 
possible future offers being foreclosed.  Id.; see also Gully v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 
766, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that settlement offer that “does not expressly or implicitly indicate 
that no other offer will be made passes muster”); Reade-Alvarez v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 
369 F. Supp. 2d 353, 361–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the offer to keep the payment plan open 
for ten days only did not make the letter false, misleading, or deceptive). 
 207.   See Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1063. 
 208.  442 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828–29 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (examining the difference between a one-
time offer and an offer of limited duration that is not false within meaning of FDCPA because it is 
unaccompanied by language implying that it is available one time). 
 209.  See Goswami, 377 F.3d at 495.  The collector’s settlement language made it appear as 
though the collector was making “a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it offer” that had only a thirty-day life.  
Id.  This is certainly different from an offer that is valid only if funds are received or secured no later 
than a certain date.  See Hernandez v. AFNI, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  Cf. 
Prophet v. Myers, 645 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss consumer claim that settlement offer was misleading because it stipulated that payment must 
be recovered within thirty days of the date of the collection letter). 
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as a safe harbor in Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., where it 
acknowledged that a confusing settlement offer might be deceptive.210  
The collector’s assurance that there is no obligation to renew the offer 
puts the transaction in proper perspective, for then the consumer will 
know that she cannot count on another opportunity to settle matters.  It is 
questionable, though, whether a collector should have to go to such 
lengths to indicate that a settlement offer has a limited life.  The collector 
must avoid the pitfall of pretending that the offer is final when it knows it 
is not.211  But that is quite different from an obligation to set the record 
straight about the possibilities of renewing the settlement offer.  Such a 
requirement would leave the settlement mechanism in shambles, for then 
the collector would have to disclose its future plans for dealing with the 
consumer if the initial overtures do not succeed. 
D. Characterizing the Debt 
A collector violates § 1692e if it misrepresents “the character, 
amount, or legal status of any debt.”212  One may expect little leeway in 
misstating the amount of the debt, but Wahl v. Midland Credit 
Management, Inc.213 illustrates that collectors have some breathing space 
under this requirement.  In Wahl, the collector was sued when it broke 
down the amount due of $1,181.49 as constituting the principal balance 
of $1,149.09 and accrued interest of $32.40.214  The consumer 
complained that the $1,149.09 figure included not only the principal 
amount owed on the credit card to the original creditor, but also interest 
and late fees charged on that outstanding balance before the account was 
transferred to the collector.215  The consumer argued that the collector’s 
statement was false because it included in the amount due the principal 
balance owed and the amount of interest that had accrued on the debt 
before the collector took over the account.216 
The consumer had a technical point, if one views the principal as an 
original sum of money owed;217 in this case it was the amount obtained 
                                                          
 210.  505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 211.  See Dekoven v. Plaza Assocs., 599 F.3d 578, 579 (7th Cir. 2010); Campuzano-Burgos v. 
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008); Goswami, 377 F.3d at 496. 
 212.  15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A) (2006). 
 213.  556 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 214.  Id. at 644. 
 215.  Id.  
 216.  Id. at 645. 
 217.  One dictionary defines “principal” as “a capital sum as distinguished from interest or 
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through the credit card.  But the court viewed the transaction from the 
collector’s perspective, and when the collector took over the debt, the 
amount was for a global figure that comprised both the original amount 
obtained through the credit card and the interest that had accumulated 
because of the consumer’s delinquency.218  So the collector started out 
with the figure that was outstanding at the time it took over the 
account.219  The court found that the collection letter would not mislead 
an unsophisticated consumer because it was not enough that the term 
“principal balance” was technically false.220  An unsophisticated 
consumer would understand that when the account reached the collector, 
the principal balance included interest already levied by the creditor. 
The Seventh Circuit took the opportunity in Hahn v. Triumph 
Partnerships LLC to emphasize that a false statement must be material to 
come under the § 1692e umbrella, because an immaterial falsehood has 
no impact on the statutory objective to help consumers make intelligent 
decisions.221  On the facts in Hahn, a consumer would not have been 
misled in any respect, because the figures did not change.222  There, the 
collector specified the amount it wanted to recover, identifying 
separately the amount of the debt outstanding when the collector 
received the account and the collector’s interest charges on that 
amount.223  But, in Hahn, the court found the collector’s statement to be 
true when the collector stated the interest due as $82.64, although the 
amount due when the debt was assigned to the collector also included 
interest on the original debt.224  The consumer urged the court to read the 
                                                                                                                       
 
income.” THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 948 (8th ed. 1990).  Following 
the consumer’s argument, this definition leaves no room for the inclusion of interest.  The consumer 
could have avoided any problem by not using the term “principal.”  After all, the statute forbids the 
false representation of the amount of any debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 
 218.  Wahl, 556 F.3d at 644. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  The court stressed that a technical falsehood was not enough to find that the collector had 
violated the statute.  See id. at 646.  The consumer had to show that the statement would mislead an 
unsophisticated consumer.  See id. 
 221.  557 F.3d 755, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 222.  Id. at 757. 
 223.  Id. at 756.  In Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., the Seventh Circuit found a 
collector’s statement that the consumer’s credit card agreement had been revoked to be material.  
558 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2009).  Even under the unsophisticated consumer standard, the court 
found this statement confusing because the collector’s reference to revocation “might have suggested 
to an unsophisticated consumer that any right he might have to challenge the demand for payment 
had been extinguished by the revocation of his contract with the issuer, the original creditor.”  Id. at 
629. 
 224.  Hahn, 557 F.3d at 756. 
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statement to mean that $82.64 was the only interest due.225  Had the court 
accepted that interpretation, however, any inclusion of interest in the 
amount due before the collector received the account would have made 
the statement about the interest false.  At bottom, the court in Hahn 
found in favor of the collector not only because the collector’s statement 
was true, but, even if technically false, the statement was immaterial.226 
The Ninth Circuit in Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. followed the 
Seventh Circuit’s materiality requirement when the collector there 
demanded $32.89 in interest, a figure which included both preassignment 
finance charges and interest.227  There was no dispute about the total 
amount owed.  The consumer claimed a violation of § 1692e based on 
the technical incorrectness of the collector’s interest designation.228  The 
court was not concerned “with mere technical falsehoods that mislead no 
one,” and in this case the consumer did not dispute the debt.229  This 
illustrates the effect of the materiality requirement. 
The Sixth Circuit also lent its voice to the materiality requirement in 
Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, where a consumer complained 
about certain language in a collector’s complaint.230  First, the consumer 
objected to the language in the complaint that referred to “money 
loaned” by the credit card issuer to the consumer.231  The consumer 
asserted that the credit card issuer did not make any loan to her, and that, 
therefore, the collector violated the FDCPA when it misrepresented the 
debt as money loaned.232  Although it was true that the bank did not lend 
any money directly to the consumer, the court noted that the bank paid 
for goods that the consumer bought with the credit card and made cash 
                                                          
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 758. 
 227.  592 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 228.  See id. at 1030. 
 229.  See id. at 1034.  The Ninth Circuit explained as follows: 
In assessing FDCPA liability, we are not concerned with mere technical falsehoods that 
mislead no one, but instead with genuinely misleading statements that may frustrate a 
consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response. . . .  Here, the statement in 
the Complaint did not undermine Donohue’s ability to intelligently choose her action 
concerning her debt. 
Id. at 1034; see also FALSE STATEMENT: IF IT DOESN’T MISLEAD, IT DOESN’T VIOLATE FDCPA, 
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REPORT 3–4 (Mar. 2010) (noting that to be 
false under the FDCPA, a statement must actually mislead). 
 230.  561 F.3d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 592. 
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advances to the consumer.233  The court found additional support for not 
treating the “money loaned” phrase as a false representation of the 
transaction between the bank and the consumer inasmuch as the credit 
card agreement obligated the consumer to pay the bank all amounts 
borrowed.234  The language could have been clearer, but it was not false 
because the consumer was ultimately responsible for the amount 
advanced on her behalf to merchants and others from whom she had 
bought goods or services.235 
The consumer also alleged that the collector misled her by using the 
term “charge card” rather than “credit card.”236  It was unfortunate indeed 
that the consumer framed this as a violation of § 1692e; the least 
sophisticated consumer would hardly be led astray by the different terms 
when there was nothing confusing about the account number or the 
balance due on the debt.237  Such a consumer would hardly pause long 
enough to assess the difference between the two terms; she would 
concentrate on the amount she owed.238 
The consumer’s other allegation centered on the claim in the 
collection complaint that the collector had “acquired, for valuable 
consideration, all right, title and interest in and to the claim set forth.”239  
The consumer contended that this language violated § 1692e(12) because 
it falsely implied that the original creditor had assigned the debt to an 
innocent purchaser for value who enjoyed the status of a holder in due 
course.240  It is hard to imagine how the least sophisticated consumer 
would be misled into considering the concept of a holder in due course 
because of a complaint’s language.  Moreover, it would take some 
                                                          
 233.  Id. at 593. 
 234.  Id.  See also 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR, supra note 67, § 5.5.2.8. 
 235.  See Miller, 561 F.3d at 593. 
 236.  Id. at 595. 
 237.  Id.  The Miller court’s characterization of the collector’s language elucidated the least 
sophisticated consumer standard accepted by most courts.  The court read the consumer’s complaint 
and evaluated it in a common sense way.  Id.  The consumer would hardly ponder the difference 
between a charge card and a credit card in trying to determine the validity of the debt.  Id.  The 
Second Circuit said it best in Russell v. Equifax A.R.S.: “[T]he test is how the least sophisticated 
consumer—one not having the astuteness of a ‘Philadelphia lawyer’ or even the sophistication of the 
average, everyday, common consumer—understands the notice he or she receives.”  74 F.3d 30, 34 
(2d Cir. 1996). 
 238.  See Miller, 561 F.3d at 595. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id.  The statute forbids “[t]he false representation or implication that accounts have been 
turned over to innocent purchasers for value.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(12) (2006). 
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degree of sophistication for a consumer to match such a designation to 
the forbidden representation in § 1692e(12).241 
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNICATION 
A. Communicating with the Debtor’s Attorney 
The FDCPA has discouraged collectors from making any false or 
deceptive representations to consumers during the collection process.  If 
a collector sends a collection letter directly to a consumer, the FDCPA 
will apply to any ensuing violation.  If, however, the collector sends the 
letter to the consumer’s attorney instead, there is judicial disagreement 
about whether the statute applies.  Several circuits agree that the statute 
regulates communications from a collector to a consumer’s attorney;242 
but, the Ninth Circuit rejects that approach, ruling instead that the statute 
does not apply to false representations made to an attorney because the 
attorney protects the consumer.243 
The exoneration of the collector for a communication sent to an 
attorney, which would violate the FDCPA if sent directly to a consumer, 
does not seem to follow from the statutory language.  There is nothing in 
the FDCPA to suggest that the intervention of a debtor’s attorney 
automatically suspends application of the statute, which is intended to 
control the collector’s conduct.  It would seem odd for Congress to create 
this protective framework for consumers only to have it obliterated when 
the collector diverts its communication to a consumer’s attorney. 
There is little doubt that what takes place between a collector and a 
debtor’s attorney is in most instances a communication.244  The Fourth 
Circuit recognized a collector’s liability for such a communication in 
Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abrahamson, characterizing the collector’s contact 
with the debtor’s attorney as an indirect communication with the 
debtor.245  This was not surprising, given the statutory mandate that the 
                                                          
 241.  See Miller, 561 F.3d at 596 (stating that the least sophisticated consumer has no knowledge 
of the concept). 
 242.  Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011); Evory v. 
RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007); Sayyed v. Wolpoff & 
Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 243.  Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 244.  The statute defines communication as “the conveying of information regarding a debt 
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 
 245.  Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232–33.  If the statute did not prevent the collector’s direct 
communication with a represented consumer, then the collector would obviously make a direct 
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collector should not communicate with the consumer once the collector 
knows about the consumer’s legal representation.246  Put simply, the 
collector really has no choice about its point of contact once an attorney 
enters the picture.247  The limitation on contacting a represented debtor is 
part of an elaborate scheme intended to protect the consumer during her 
most vulnerable moments, and it would be inconsistent with that 
statutory design to shield a collector from liability once an attorney is on 
board.248 
In Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, the Ninth Circuit took a 
different view, holding that a collector could not be liable for a 
communication sent directly to a debtor’s attorney.249  The Guerrero 
court treated the consumer and his attorney as two different people, so 
that even if the collector ignored its statutory responsibility to the 
consumer, it had no effect on any communication that the collector had 
with the attorney.250  The court emphasized the distinction between the 
two relationships by reminding the parties that a collector could not 
contact a consumer who was represented by an attorney unless the 
attorney approved that contact.251  The court further observed that the 
collector could not communicate with “any person other than the 
consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency . . . , the creditor, 
the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.”252  In 
line with this provision, the statute also defines “consumer” as including 
“the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, 
executor, or administrator.”253  This definition provided further support 
                                                                                                                       
 
communication.  The inability to make such a communication should not put the violator in a better 
position when the communication is indirect. 
 246.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). 
 247.  Of course, a consumer or his attorney can always give consent for a collector to contact the 
consumer directly.  Id. 
 248.  The Sayyed court relied on Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 293 (1995), where the 
communication was between a debt collection attorney and the consumer’s attorney.  Sayyed, 485 
F.3d at 230.  The United States Supreme Court held that the consumer had a cause of action under 
the FDCPA for statements contained in the collector’s letter to the consumer’s attorney.  Heintz, 514 
U.S. at 294. 
 249.  499 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 250.  See id. at 935 (“A consumer and his attorney are not one and the same for purposes of the 
[FDCPA].  They are legally distinct entities, and the Act consequently treats them as such.”). 
 251.  See id. (“[A] debt collector who knows that a consumer has retained counsel regarding the 
subject debt may contact counsel, but may not generally contact the consumer directly, unless the 
attorney gives his consent.” (footnote omitted)). 
 252.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006)).  
 253.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (2006). 
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for the court’s recognition of the consumer and his attorney as two 
different persons, one of whom—the attorney—the statute did not intend 
to protect from collectors’ deceptive practices.254 
Some courts view an attorney as an intermediary in the collection 
process, able to bear the brunt of a cunning collector so that a debtor 
client does not have to endure a collector’s pressure tactics.255  It is not 
clear why there should be a statutory incentive for a collector to pursue a 
devious collection strategy once an attorney replaces her client as the 
recipient of the collection letter.  Such conduct is justified only if the 
collector’s letter is not considered an indirect communication to the 
debtor.  The statute itself defines communication as “the conveying of 
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through 
any medium.”256  Thus, the intervention of an attorney does not 
transform the contact between the collector and the attorney into some 
independent liaison having nothing to do with the collection of an 
outstanding debt.257  When a consumer has legal representation, the 
collector must deal directly with the attorney.258  This does not mean that 
the original transaction between the consumer and the collector takes on 
                                                          
 254.  See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935 (noting that “[t]he statute as a whole . . . suggests . . . that, 
when it comes to debt collection matters, lawyers and their debtor clients will be treated differently” 
because “Congress did not view attorneys as susceptible to the abuses that spurred the need for the 
legislation . . . .”). 
 255.  See id. (“[I]t appears that Congress viewed attorneys as intermediaries able to bear the 
brunt of overreaching debt collection practices from which debtors and their loved ones should be 
protected.”); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where an attorney is 
interposed as an intermediary between a debt collector and a consumer, we assume the attorney, 
rather than the FDCPA, will protect the consumer from a debt collector’s fraudulent or harassing 
behavior.”); Zaborac v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(“[A] consumer’s attorney is quite properly considered an intermediary between the debt collector 
and the consumer, and as such has his or her own responsibility for protecting the consumer . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 256.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 
 257.  See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 943 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(concluding that § 1692e covers communications between a collector and an attorney representing a 
debtor because “[t]here is nothing in the text of the FDCPA to indicate that attorneys representing 
debtors are excluded from the class of third parties to whom a debt collector may not make a false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation.”); Misleh v. Timothy E. Baxter & Assocs., 786 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1335 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (deciding that the FDCPA does not regulate only those 
communications between a collector and the consumer, but also applies to a collector’s 
communications with a consumer’s attorney); Capitol Credit & Collection Serv. v. Armani, 206 P.3d 
1114, 1120 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (determining that § 1692e of the FDCPA includes communications 
by the collector to the debtor’s attorney). 
 258.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (prohibiting a debt collector from communicating with a 
consumer in connection with the collection of any debt “if the debt collector knows the consumer is 
represented by an attorney.”). 
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new form, thus granting the collector free rein to do as it pleases.259  The 
prohibition against false or deceptive representations does not disappear 
just because the collector is no longer addressing the consumer directly.  
The collector must still obey the statute if it is taking action in 
connection with the collection of a debt. 
In the case of a represented consumer, a collector surely must know 
that the attorney will share with her client any information she obtains 
during the collection process.  The statute does not purport to protect a 
deceptive collector whose misbehavior does not reach the debtor directly.  
The collector must convey its message indirectly to the represented 
consumer, because the statute forbids the collector from communicating 
with the consumer if it knows, or can readily ascertain, the attorney’s 
name and address.260  This limitation on the collector’s direct contact 
does not provide a sanctuary for the collector, but instead insulates the 
consumer from interaction with the collector.  Section 1692e prohibits a 
collector from communicating “to any person” false credit information 
that relates to conduct in connection with the collection of a debt.261  This 
reference to any person obviously includes parties other than the 
consumer.  It is conceivable therefore that a consumer’s attorney could 
be one such person, but that would not make the section inapplicable to 
the debtor’s attorney simply because the attorney is not the consumer.262  
Therefore, a broad reading of the statute should provide a remedy for the 
consumer by recognizing a communication as the “conveying of 
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through 
                                                          
 259.  Judge Fletcher gave a good example in Guerrero about the effect of insulating a debt 
collector from liability with respect to false representations to the consumer’s attorney: 
[A]ssume that a debt collector sends to a debtor’s attorney false documents purporting to 
verify a debt.  In such a case, the attorney might discover the truth and protect the debtor, 
but she might not.  Even if the attorney does discover the truth, she will likely have spent 
time and money doing so.  If § 1692e does not forbid sending false documents to the 
debtor’s attorney, the debtor will have to pay the attorney’s fees and expenses out of his 
or her own pocket.  On the other hand, if § 1692e forbids such communications with the 
debtor’s attorney, the debtor will be able to recover damages and attorney’s fees.  
Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 945 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 260.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (“[A] debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by 
an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s 
name and address . . . .”). 
 261. Id. § 1692e(8). 
 262.  See Quesenberry v. Alliant Law Group., No. 4:09-cv-414, 2010 WL 1189457, at *3 (E.D. 
Tex. Mar. 5, 2010) (explaining that § 1692a(2) defines “communication” as the conveying of 
information through any medium); 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 67, § 5.5.11. 
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any medium.”263  The statute may reach the collector’s conduct either to 
stop the spread of certain information about the consumer or to prevent 
other false representations.264  In this respect, a consumer’s attorney may 
be either a person or a medium, depending on the context.265 
The Fourth Circuit clarified in Sayyed that a communication to a 
debtor’s attorney is an indirect communication to the debtor.266  This was 
a reasonable conclusion, given the statutory definition of 
communication.267  However, the court should not have gone further to 
rely on Heintz v. Jenkins,268 for although there was attorney-to-attorney 
contact in that case, the Court only had to consider the question of 
whether the FDCPA applied to attorneys who collect consumer debts 
through litigation.269  It was a jurisdictional question, therefore, and 
Heintz did not provide any direct support for the issue considered in 
Sayyed.  When the Third Circuit in Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, 
N. A., joined the Fourth Circuit in covering a collector’s contact with the 
consumer’s attorney, that court noted its disagreement with Sayyed about 
the relevance of Heintz in this context.270  In Allen, the question was 
whether § 1692f covered the collector’s letters to a consumer’s attorney 
containing unauthorized fees,271 an issue the Heintz Court did not 
consider.  The Third Circuit noted that it parted with the Fourth Circuit 
on the Heintz factor, realizing that it could support Sayyed without a 
Heintz-like diversion.272  There was nothing in the statute to direct a 
                                                          
 263.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 
 264.  See Misleh v. Timothy E. Baxter & Assocs., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (E.D. Mich. 2011) 
(explaining that § 1692 forbids collectors from using deceptive, false, or misleading representations 
or any other unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt). 
 265.  Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 266.  See Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A 
communication to debtor’s counsel . . . qualifies as an indirect communication to the debtor.”). 
 267.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (defining communication as “the conveying of information regarding 
a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”). 
 268.  514 U.S. 291 (1995). 
 269.  Id. at 292 (identifying the issue as “whether the term ‘debt collector’ . . . applies to a lawyer 
who ‘regularly,’ through litigation, tries to collect consumer debts.”).   
 270.  629 F.3d 364, 368 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining the difference between issues addressed 
in Sayyed and Heintz). 
 271.  Id. at 365. 
 272.  In Allen the issue was “whether § 1692f(1) governs communications from a debt collector 
to a consumer’s attorney.”  Id. at 368.  In Heintz the Court had to determine whether the FDCPA 
applied to attorneys trying to collect debts through litigation.  See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 292 (“[T]he 
issue before us is whether the [FDCPA] . . . applies to a lawyer who ‘regularly’ through litigation, 
tries to collect consumer debts.”).  In Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, the Ninth Circuit, in 
holding that the FDCPA did not cover a collector’s letter to a consumer’s lawyer, criticized the 
Sayyed court for construing Heintz as somehow indirectly acknowledging that the FDCPA covers 
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court to ignore an improper communication simply because the collector 
routed it to the consumer’s attorney rather than to the consumer directly.  
The Allen court felt that absolving the collector of liability in this context 
would weaken the deterrent effect of the statute’s strict liability.273 
When the Seventh Circuit joined the fray in Evory v. RJM 
Acquisitions Funding, LLC, it sided with Sayyed by recognizing that 
communications to attorneys are subject to the statute.274  In so doing, 
however, it introduced a new wrinkle that a collector’s representation 
should not be actionable if it would be unlikely to deceive a “competent 
lawyer.”275  This standard lightens the load for the erring collector 
because the collector no longer has to worry about the unsophisticated 
consumer who may have succumbed to the collector’s deception.  One 
wonders whether the drafters could have intended this result, given 
Congress’s intent to halt deceptive collection practices.  It is perplexing 
to ascertain how the competent lawyer standard applies in a case in 
which the collector misstates the amount of the debt in its collection 
letter.276  The consumer who has an attorney is, in a sense, in a worse 
position than one who does not because the represented consumer cannot 
use her lack of sophistication to hold the collector accountable.  The 
broad definition of communication recognizes that the collector’s letter 
to the consumer’s attorney constitutes an indirect advisory statement to 
the consumer about the state of affairs, and the collector’s responsibility 
for conveying accurate information should not be diminished just 
because an attorney is the conduit. 
                                                                                                                       
 
communications with a consumer’s attorney.  499 F.3d 926, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 273.  See Allen, 629 F.3d at 368 (“If an otherwise improper communication would escape 
FDCPA liability simply because that communication was directed to a consumer’s attorney, it would 
undermine the deterrent effect of strict liability.”). 
 274.  505 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 275.  Id. at 775. 
 276.  In Evory, the Seventh Circuit recognized the problem: 
A false claim of fact in a dunning letter may be as difficult for a lawyer to see through as 
a consumer.  Suppose the letter misrepresents the unpaid balance of the consumer’s debt.  
The lawyer might be unable to discover the falsity of the representation without an 
investigation that he might be unable, depending on his client’s resources, to undertake.  
Such a misrepresentation would be actionable whether made to the consumer directly, or 
indirectly through his lawyer.  
Id. at 775; see also Matmanivong v. Unifund CCR Partners, No. 08 CV 6415, 2009 WL 1181529, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2009). 
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B. The Request to Cease Communicating 
The FDCPA imposes an obligation on the collector to suspend its 
activities until it fulfills the statute’s verification requirements.277  
Suspension is the automatic response when the consumer disputes the 
debt, but the consumer may simply ask the collector to cease further 
communication with her without any thought of disputing the debt.278  In 
that event, the collector must heed the consumer’s request, although the 
collector has one last chance to communicate with the consumer about 
certain remedies that it intends to pursue.279 
Therefore, the right to halt the collector’s communication with the 
consumer comes at a price: the collector gets a parting shot.  A consumer 
would welcome the good news that the collector is abandoning its 
collection efforts; the same cannot be said about a recitation of the 
collector’s remedies.  The collector’s last contact with the consumer 
about specified remedies is not likely to be polite.  It serves merely as an 
invitation to the collector to emphasize its message, leaving the 
consumer with a reminder of the alternatives that await her if she does 
not respond favorably to the collector. 
The FTC Official Staff Commentary advises that a collector cannot 
include a demand for payment in its response to a consumer’s request to 
the collector to cease communicating.280  It is possible, however, for a 
collector to use its last contact to advance its agenda on payment 
options.281  When the collector made such an overture in Lewis v. ACB 
Business Services, Inc., it found a sympathetic ear in the Sixth Circuit, 
despite the consumer’s contention that the collection letter was a demand 
for payment couched as a remedy.282  It seemed in Lewis that the 
collector used § 1692c(c) as just another stop in the collection process, 
although the section contemplates merely that the collector can advise 
the consumer about contemplated remedies.283  Once the consumer has 
                                                          
 277.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2006). 
 278.  See id. § 1692c(c) (stating when a collector may no longer communicate with a consumer). 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  FTC Official Staff Commentary § 805(c)-2, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (Dec. 13, 1988).  
 281.  The FTC Official Staff Commentary recognizes that the collector’s response is limited to 
the three exceptions covered by § 1692(c).  Id. 
 282.  135 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 283.  Section 1692c(c) provides in pertinent part: 
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt 
or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the 
consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with 
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exercised her statutory option to end the collector’s contact with her, it is 
too late for the collector to contact the consumer again under the pretext 
of offering payment options as a part of the collector’s ordinary 
remedies.284  The reference to remedies in § 1692c(c) suggests that the 
collector wants to go further to ensure recovery of the outstanding debt 
because the consumer has closed all other avenues for communication, 
including the possibility of reaching a settlement.285  The statute prevents 
the collector from making further overtures once the consumer has 
exercised her option to cease further contact with the collector.  It is 
doubtful that the drafters intended to allow a collector to contrive some 
mechanism for continuing a dialogue with the consumer—even though a 
settlement may ensue—when the consumer makes it clear that she wants 
to end contact.286  If the collector is dissatisfied with the consumer’s 
request for silence, it then can inform the consumer about its plans to 
recover the debt.287 
                                                                                                                       
 
respect to such debt, except— 
 . . . . 
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified 
remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or 
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to 
invoke a specified remedy.   
15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). 
 284.  In Lewis, the collection letter provided in pertinent part: “In order to provide you with an 
opportunity to pay this debt, please select one of the following payment arrangements and enclose 
payment, or provide me with a number where I can contact you to discuss terms.”  Lewis, 135 F.3d 
at 396.  This language is more like an attempt to induce payment than an indication of unilateral 
action by the collector to collect the debt.   
 285.  If the statute allowed a collector to continue with its offers of various payment plans 
despite the consumer’s request for the collector to cease communications, the consumer would be at 
the mercy of the collector.  The statute would be ineffective in deterring the collector from further 
contact.  Thus, the collector’s language need not be abusive in nature for the collector to run afoul of 
the statute.  A consumer may not want to be bothered by a series of payment options, which may be 
nothing more than a request for payment.  1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 67, § 5.3.8.2.  
 286.  The consumer need not use any special language to make her point.  See Bishop v. I.C. 
Sys., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that the consumer’s indication that 
“[a]ny further correspondence from [the collector] or any other collection agency will be discarded 
or returned to [the collector unopened” was sufficient to send a message that the consumer wanted 
the collector to cease communications).  A consumer must be careful not to send mixed messages.  
See Shrestha v. State Credit Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. Conn. 2000) 
(finding no statutory violation when the consumer asked the collector to call while requesting it to 
cease its collection efforts). 
 287.  See Conklin v. Purcell, Krug & Haller, No. 1:05-CV-1726, 2007 WL 404047, at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. Feb. 1, 2007) (finding law firm did not violate statute by sending notice of sheriff’s sale, even if 
consumer did not want further contact from collector), aff’d, 282 F. App’x 193 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Cohen v. Beachside Two-I Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 05-706 ADM/JS, 2006 WL 1795140, at *14 
(D. Minn. June 29, 2006) (finding no federal statutory violation despite cease communication 
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The collector can notify the consumer that it may invoke certain 
remedies that it ordinarily pursues in trying to collect a debt.288  The 
collector does not have to follow through on its threat, and so one 
wonders about the reason for allowing a collector to inform a consumer 
about the possibility of involving the collector’s ordinary remedies.289  
This provision seems to facilitate a collector’s last opportunity for 
pressuring the consumer.  It allows a collector to introduce a mere 
possibility of future action when the consumer has already indicated that 
she does not want to be bothered.  The collector’s last-minute notice to 
the consumer is simply another communication in the collection scheme, 
and should not override the consumer’s directive to the collector.290  By 
the time the consumer notifies the collector that she wants no further 
communication, the collector has usually been in frequent contact with 
the consumer.  It will come as no surprise to the consumer that the 
collector gets more aggressive as time goes on.  The possibility of 
invoking the collector’s ordinary remedies does not introduce a new 
element into the collection process.  A collector has continuing interest in 
seeking a remedy, and the statute merely allows a collector to emphasize 
the possibility of further action, including litigation. 
There is a stronger case for allowing a collector to state its intent to 
invoke a specified remedy even when a collector does not ordinarily 
pursue such a remedy.  It is the collector’s intent that makes the 
difference, for the consumer will know that her notice to the collector to 
cease communication will trigger the collector’s search for a remedy.291  
After all, if the consumer does not want to hear from the collector 
anymore, the collector should be able to respond formally to the 
                                                                                                                       
 
directive where attorney returned consumer’s check and notified consumer of foreclosure), aff’d as 
modified, 272 F. App’x 534 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 288.  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2). 
 289.  Compare id. (allowing collector to notify the consumer that the collector may invoke 
specified remedies), with id. § 1692(c)(3) (allowing collector to notify the consumer that the 
collector intends to invoke a specified remedy).  The collector can be found in violation if it lacks 
intent to sue but merely threatens the consumer to prod her into action.  See id. § 1692e(5).   
 290.  The statute dictates that “the debt collector shall not communicate further with the 
consumer” except in three situations.  Id. § 1692c(c).  The drafters have not given a clue as to why 
further communication is in the consumer’s interest. 
 291.  One authority has stated that “it is much easier to prove a violation of . . . section 
[1692c(c)] when a collector falsely threatens a consumer with an extraordinary action than when it 
does so with an action that it ordinarily takes in such situations.”  1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
supra note 67, § 5.3.8.2 (footnote omitted).  This is as it should be.  A collector should be held to its 
intent, rather than be able to create discomfort for the consumer through the possible invocation of 
its ordinary remedies.  
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consumer’s intransigence.  The collector’s notice to the consumer about 
a specified remedy in this context gives the consumer adequate 
information about the collector’s plans.  If the collector does not follow 
through, the consumer will have an independent basis for challenging the 
genuineness of the collector’s threat.292 
Sometimes a consumer will create some confusion about her request 
that the collector cease communication.  If the consumer gives her 
directive to the collector and stops there, there is no problem.  However, 
the consumer may seek details of the debt, even while expressing her 
refusal to pay.  This kind of language sends a mixed message, as the 
collector may view the consumer’s refusal as a temporary delay until the 
collector fulfills its statutory obligation to verify the debt.293  It is in the 
consumer’s interest, therefore, to make clear to the collector that she 
wants no further communication once the collector provides the 
necessary verification.  By doing so, the consumer will leave no doubt 
about her intent concerning future contacts. 
It is an interesting question, though, whether the consumer’s notice 
to the collector to stop communicating with the consumer applies to 
communications with the consumer’s attorney.  In Tinsley v. Integrity 
Financial Partners, Inc., the consumer’s attorney could not have been 
clearer when he responded to the collector with the following language: 
“[W]e request that you cease all further collection activities and direct all 
future communications to our office.”294  The collector refrained from 
contacting the consumer and directed its request for payment to the 
attorney.295  The consumer felt that the attorney’s letter prevented the 
collector from continuing its collection contacts with both the consumer 
and his attorney.296  Maybe this was what the consumer had in mind, but 
the attorney nevertheless invited future communications to his office.297  
The other possibility is that the consumer may have wanted to stop all 
                                                          
 292.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (permitting suit for a threat to take any action the collector does 
not intend to take); id. § 1692e(10) (permitting suit for using deceptive means to collect debt).   
 293.  See Reed v. Global Acceptance Credit Co., No. C-08-01826 RMW, 2008 WL 3330165, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (denying summary judgment on consumer’s § 1692c(c) claim where 
consumer mailed letter disputing the debt and refusing to pay). 
 294.  634 F.3d 416, 416 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  See id. at 417. 
 297.  The letter from the consumer’s attorney not only requested the collector to stop its 
collection activities, but also invited the collector to contact the attorney’s office in the future.  Id. at 
416. 
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communications to him, but had no intention to restrict communications 
to his attorney. 
The consumer’s position in Tinsley was that the attorney was the 
debtor’s agent, so that when the collector continued its correspondence 
with the attorney, it effectively continued its collection contacts despite 
the consumer’s admonition to stop.298  The consumer’s discomfort with 
that possibility made no difference because § 1692c(a)(2) allows a 
collector to communicate with the consumer’s attorney even though the 
consumer may object to the collector’s direct contact.299  It is reasonable, 
therefore, to read “consumer” and “attorney” as having different 
meanings in subsection (a)(2), because the language there offers the 
collector an acceptable alternative for contact when the consumer wants 
to avoid the collector.  Subsection (b) also supports this approach 
because, without the consumer’s consent, a collector cannot 
communicate with anybody “other than the consumer, his attorney, a 
consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, 
the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.”300  This 
recognition of the different capacities of a consumer and her attorney 
simply reflects the understanding that a consumer’s attempt to sever her 
connection with the collector does not simultaneously terminate the 
collector’s authority to communicate with the attorney.301  After all, this 
would run counter to the notion that § 1692c carves out different roles 
for consumer and attorney, and that would be inconsistent with the 
objective of allowing a consumer’s attorney to seek a settlement even if 
the consumer wants to avoid direct confrontation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that the FDCPA has motivated collectors to 
reform their collection methods, much to the advantage of consumers in 
                                                          
 298.  Id. at 417. 
 299.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2006) (permitting communication where the attorney 
consents). 
 300.  Id. § 1692c(b). 
 301.  The consumer’s attorney invited the collector’s communication, thus establishing himself 
as the future point of contact.  Tinsley, 634 F.3d at 416.  Section 1692c(a)(2) and (c) work in 
harmony because once a collector knows about the consumer’s legal representation, it cannot 
communicate with the consumer any more without the consumer’s consent.  15 U.S.C. § 
1692c(a)(2).  Thus, the consumer’s invocation of her right to stop the collector from further 
communication with the consumer does not affect the collector’s right to contact the consumer’s 
attorney.  See DEBT COLLECTOR MAY FREELY COMMUNICATE WITH CONSUMER’S LAWYER, 
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REPORT 2–3 (Apr. 2011). 
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the marketplace.  Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that some 
collectors still seek to gain advantage from the magical law firm 
letterhead, while at the same time feigning ignorance of the details of a 
consumer’s file.  The accommodation of a disclaimer in this context only 
sends a conflicting message to the consumer about an attorney’s role in 
the transaction.  The disclaimer’s function is to tell the consumer that the 
collector is not functioning in the capacity of an attorney, but a 
communication on law firm letterhead sends a powerful message that the 
consumer should be thinking about its legal ramifications.  When the first 
paragraph of a collection letter indicates that the collector is a law firm 
“representing financial institutions in the area of creditors rights,”302 a 
consumer cannot be blamed for believing that the firm is involved in a 
legal capacity, despite the reassurance in the letter’s subsequent language 
that no attorney has reviewed the particular circumstances of the 
consumer’s account.  This Article submits that courts must not allow a 
simple disclaimer to override the overall indicators of an attorney’s 
involvement, for an attorney collector must realize that her status as an 
attorney drives home the message that the consumer is now in the legal 
arena.303  If an attorney wants to avoid any ambiguity about her role, she 
has the obligation to make any disclaimer conspicuous and not leave the 
collection letter subject to more than one interpretation.304 
Although there is some disagreement in the courts about whether the 
FDCPA should regulate communications between a collector and a 
consumer’s attorney, this Article submits that those courts supporting an 
exemption for such communications provide an incentive for a collector 
to avoid the statutory restrictions.  Although the statute requires a 
collector to communicate with a consumer’s attorney once there is 
evidence that the attorney has entered the picture, it does not give the 
collector free rein to do as it pleases in that event.  There is much to be 
said for recognizing that indirect contact with the attorney constitutes a 
communication under the statute.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
the statute gives less protection to a represented consumer.  It would 
hardly be acceptable for such a consumer to be disadvantaged compared 
                                                          
 302.  Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1000, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 303.  Id. at 1002–03. 
 304.  See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that attorney must state 
clearly and conspicuously that she is acting solely as a collector when sending a collection letter); 
Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114 (D. Or. 2009) (finding violation 
where disclaimer was obscured by rest of letter); Smith v. Harrison, No. 07-4255 (WHW), 2008 WL 
2704825, at *4 (D.N.J. July 7, 2008) (finding violation where letter’s ambiguity left open multiple 
interpretations, one of which was unlawful). 
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to an unrepresented consumer.  The distinction between the two types 
leads to a query about the real meaning of communication under the 
statute and raises doubts about whether a collector’s conduct avoids the 
collection label simply because the collector is not in direct contact with 
the consumer. 
 
